Apollo Experience Report: Command and Service Module Reaction Control Systems by Weary, Dwayne P. & Taeuber, Ralph J.
N A S A  TECHNICAL NOTE 
w 
w 
m 
z c 
1 APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT - 
COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE 
REACTION CONTROL SYSTEMS 
by Raph J. Taeuber and Dwayne P. Weury 
~ I Manned Spacecrafi Center 
~ Houston, Texas 77058 
I N A T I O N A L  AERONAUTICS A N D  SPACE ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON,  D. C. JUNE 1973 I 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19730017174 2020-03-11T16:26:30+00:00Z
1. Report No. 
NASA TN D- 7151 
4. Title and Subtitle 
APOLLOEXPERIENCEREPORT 
COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE REACTION CONTROL 
SYSTEMS 
2. Government Accession No. 
7. Author(s) 
Ralph J. Taeuber and Dwayne P. Weary, MSC 
17. Key Words (Suggested by Author(s)) 
' Rocket Engines ' System Contamination 
'Attitude Control ' Spacecraft Propulsion 
' Command and Service Module 
* Reaction Control 
' Propellant Systems 
' Apollo Experience 
* System Development 
9. Performing Organization Name and Address 
Manned Spacecraft Center 
Houston, Texas 77058 
18. Distribution Statement 
'2. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address 
19. Security Classif. (of this report) 
None None 54 
20. Security Classif. (of this page) 21. No. of Pages 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Washington, D. C. 20546 
22. Price 
$3.00 
15. Suoolementarv Notes 
3. Recipient's Catalog No. 
5. Report Date 
June 1973 --_ 
6. Performing Organization Code 
8. Performing Organization Report No. 
MSC S-336 
10. Work Unit No. 
914-11-10-00-72 
11. Contract or Grant No. 
13. Type of Report and Period Covered 
Technical Note 
~~ 
14. Sponsoring Agency Code 
The 'MSC Director waived the use of the International System of Units (SI) for this Apollo Experience 
Report, because, in his judgment, use of SI units would impair the usefulness of the report o r  result 
in excessive cost. 
16. Abstract 
The reaction control systems of the Apollo command and service module were developed and 
modified between July 1961 and July 1969. The successful development of these systems, as 
part  of the Apollo Program, was the result of extensive testing, retesting, and modifications 
of the hardware to  ensure system capability and intrasystem compatibility. 
~~~ 
* For sale by the National Technical  Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22151 
CONTENTS 
Section 
SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
INITIAL CONCEPTS . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Preliminary Design . . . . . . . . . . .  
Functional Description of the SM RCS . 
Functional Description of the CM RCS . 
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM . . . . . . .  
Command Module RCS Tests . . . . . .  
Service Module RCS Tests . . . . . . .  
System-Level Vibration Tests . . . . .  
System Thermal Vacuum Tests . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . .  
Component Certification and Qualification of the CSM RCS 
FLIGHT MISSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Mission A- 102 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Missions SA-8 and SA- 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Mission A-004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Mission AS-201 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Mission AS-202 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Apollo 4 Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Apollo 6 Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Apollo 7 Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Apollo 8 Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . .  
. . . . .  
. . . . .  
. . . . .  
. . . . .  
. . . . .  
. . . . .  
. . . . .  
. . . . .  
. . . . .  
. . . . .  
. . . . .  
. . . . .  
. . . . .  
. . . . .  
. . . . .  
. . . . .  
. . . . .  
. . . . .  
. . . . .  
. . . . . .  
. . . . . .  
Apollo 9 Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . .  
. . . .  
. . . .  
. . . .  
. . . .  
. . . .  
. . . .  
. . . .  
. . . .  
. . . .  
. . . .  
. . . .  
. . . .  
. . . .  
. . . .  
. . . .  
. . . .  
. . . .  
. . . .  
. . . .  
. . . .  
. . . .  
. . . .  
Page 
1 
1 
2 
3 
5 
9 
10 
11 
13 
15 
16 
17 
27 
27 
28 
29 
29 
33 
34 
35 
37 
41 
43 
iii 
Section Page 
Apollo 10 Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45 
Apollo 11 Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48 
REFERENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49 
FIGURES 
Figure 
1 The SM RCS panel assembly (Block 11) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
2 Schematic of the SM RCS (Block 11) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
3 Cross section of the SM RCS engine assembly (spacecraft 011 and 
subsequent vehicles) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
4 The CSM RCS test  point disconnect coupling . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
5 The CSM RCS helium f i l l  disconnect coupling . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
6 The CSM RCS helium check valve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
7 The SM RCS helium pressure relief valve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
8 The CM RCS burst disk assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
9 Typical CSM RCS propellant tank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
10 The CM RCS engine assembly (Block I and Block 11) 
(a) Valve assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
(b) Engine assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Page 
4 
4 
7 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
24 
11 The SM RCS (Block I) 
(a) Service module, showing location of quads . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30 
(b) Quad, showing location of components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30 
Schematic of the SM RCS quad (Block I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12 
13 
14 
30 
31 
31 
Component locations on the CM RCS (Block I, +Y axis) . . . . . . . . .  
Component locations on the CM RCS (Block I, -Y axis) . . . . . . . . .  
iv 
Figure 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Page 
Schematic of the CM RCS propellant feed systems A and B 
(Block I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31 
Location of the RCS and SPS components within the SM (Block 11) 
(a) Topview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38 
(b) View looking inboard, bays 3 and 6 (bays 2 and 5 mirror  
image) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38 
The SM RCS quad engine package (Block 11). (a) Quad; (b) Engine 
package propellant manifold; (c) Complete engine package assembly; 
(d) Engine mounting structure, inboard view; (e) Engine mounting 
structure, outboard view . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39 
Schematic of the CM RCS (Block 11) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39 
V 
APOLLO EXPERl ENCE REPORT 
COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE REACTION CONTROL SYSTEMS 
B y  Ralph J. Taeuber and Dwayne P. Weary 
Manned Spacecraft Center  
SUMMARY 
The development of the command module reaction control system and the service 
module reaction control system resulted in hardware that was capable of meeting lunar 
mission requirements. The initial system concepts were identified and engineered into 
preliminary designs, refined, adapted to mathematical models, and subjected to engi- 
neering evaluation. Although off -the- shelf components were not available, state-of- 
the-art technology was applied whenever possible in building prototype items. Also, 
extensive component development, certification, and qualification tests were conducted. 
In particular, component development testing resulted in numerous design iterations. 
Additionally, both vibration and thermal vacuum tests were conducted on components 
that were assembled to represent flight systems. Successive unmanned flight tes ts  were 
evaluated, necessary changes were made, and the command module and service module 
reaction control systems were certified for manned flights. The Apollo 7 to 10 missions 
resulted in o r  involved system refinements. 
INTRODUCTION 
The first statement of work released by the NASA Space Task Group specified 
that the Apollo spacecraft would be composed of a command module (CM) and a service 
module (SM). Each module was to be attitude stabilized by a bipropellant reaction con- 
t ro l  system (RCS). A significant advancement in the state of the a r t  would be required 
in the areas of RCS cycle life and operational life. Development problems in these as 
well as other areas were encountered in the component and system development pro- 
grams. This report describes the evolution of the Apollo CM and SM RCS from the 
description in the first statement of work to the systems required for the first lunar 
landing. Particular attention is given to problems encountered, and recommendations 
are made concerning future space programs. 
I N I T I A L  CONCEPTS 
In July 1961, the first statement of work for the Apollo CM and SM was  issued by 
the NASA Space Task Group. This statement of work specified that the RCS for the CM 
and SM would include the following capabilities. 
1. The RCS must provide the capability for attitude control, stabilization, pro- 
pellant settling (ullage maneuver) for a vernier propulsion system, and minor velocity 
corrections. 
2. The RCS for the CM and SM would be pulse modulated and pressure fed, and 
would use storable hypergolic propellants that were identical with the propellant which 
was used in the vernier propulsion system. 
3. The propellant tanks would be of the positive expulsion type. 
By November 1961, the statement of work was expanded to include the following 
requirements. 
1. Both the CM RCS and the SM RCS were each to consist of two independent sys-  
tems; each independent system was to be capable of meeting the total torque and propel- 
lant requirements. 
2. The fuel was to be monomethylhydrazine (MMH), and the oxidizer was to be a 
mixture of nitrogen tetroxide (N204) and nitrous oxide (N20). This propellant choice 
was based on consideration of the lower allowable storage temperatures that resulted 
from the lower freezing temperatures (i. e . ,  lower than other propellants that were 
being considered). 
3. The requirement for  a vernier propulsion system was deleted. 
4. The RCS was to provide the ullage maneuver (propellant settling) thrust for 
the SM propellant. 
On November 28, 1961, NASA selected a prime contractor to design and build the 
Apollo spacecraft. On December 21, 1961, NASA authorized a letter contract for work 
to begin on the Apollo spacecraft development program, 
The functional requirements fo r  the RCS were defined early in the program. The 
SM RCS was to  provide a three-axis rotational capability for  use in orientation and 
maneuvering, transient damping, and limit cycle attitude holding. A three-axis trans- 
lational capability was  to be provided for use  in separation, rendezvous and docking, 
midcourse correction, and ullage maneuvers. Later,  an additional requirement w a s  
imposed: the capability to deorbit if a failure occurred in the service propulsion sys-  
tem (SPS). This deorbit capability requirement was applicable only for earth orbital 
missions. Initially, the CM RCS was intended to  provide only a three-axis rotational 
capability. At approximately the same time that the requirement for SM reaction con- 
t rol  deorbit capability was imposed, a CM RCS technique f o r  translation was developed. 
This CM translation conferred a hybrid deorbit capability that involved the use of both 
CM RCS and SM RCS for  total velocity increment (AV) requirements. 
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I Although the functional requirements were well defined early in the program, the 
The environments that lacked adequate early definition included boost vibration levels, 
thermal exposure ranges, fluid exposure requirements (propellant-f lush fluid and mois- 
ture compatibility requirements), shock levels, and allowable particulate contamination 
levels. 
fication levels was established. Even these qualification levels were subject to con- 
tinual changes, particularly with respect to boost vibration levels, thermal exposure 
ranges, and shock levels. Some qualification levels were not defined until the flight 
example, fluid exposure and allowable particulate contamination), it became desirable, 
either for  scheduling o r  economic reasons, to change the environmental requirements. 
These changes, which occurred late in the program, resulted in frequent configuration 
changes or  in hardware retesting to ensure compliance with revised environmental re- 
was never a major problem. The most frequent problem was the definition of the en- 
vironments to which hardware would be exposed, s o  that realistic tests could be con- 
iigured for use in the demonstration of equipment adequacy. 
, environmental conditions to which the equipment would be exposed were not well  defined. 
I 
I It was not until January 1965 that a formal, overall set of environmental quali- 
I 
I data were analyzed. In other areas where there was control over the environment (for 
I 
I 
I quirements. In retrospect, meeting an identified, real, environmental requirement 
Initial system configuration requirements were few; thus, the contractor had con- ! 
I 
siderable flexibility in the establishment of system design. However, the November 1961 
work statement contained the specification that the CM RCS and the SM RCS would both 
use two independent systems, each of which had to meet the total torque and propellant 
specifications. The early specification was implemented in the CM RCS design. Early 
in the program, the prime contractor proposed that four (rather than two) independent 
systems supply propellant to the four SM engine clusters. It was suggested that one sys- 
tem supply propellant to each engine cluster. At  the outset of the program, NASA tech- 
nical specialists opposed the concept of four independent systems. However, i t  is now 
generally agreed that the four-system concept h a s  been beneficial to the Apollo Pro- 
gram. The major benefit was derived from the capability to modularize completely each 
of the four SM systems. Other requirements which strongly influenced the choice of 
configuration were that (1) positive propellant expulsion was  to be used, and (2) the pro- 
pellant pair on both modules was to be MMH (fuel) and nitrogen tetroxide (oxidizer). 
The SM RCS fuel was changed to Aerozine-50 (A-50) and back to MMH twice during the 
course of the development program. All  manned flights used only MMH as the fuel. 
Another significant configuration constraint was imposed on the CM RCS in mid-1962. 
This constraint was  that the Gemini 100-pound-thrust engine was to be used on the 
Apollo CM. 
I 
Preliminary Design 
The basic design of the CM RCS and SM RCS was not changed appreciably from the 
original concepts. The SM RCS consisted of four independent assemblies, each of which 
was composed of a four-engine cluster (a quad), a propellant distribution system, pro- 
pellant storage tanks, and a helium pressurization system. The SM RCS panel assem- 
bly is shown in figure 1, as it existed on spacecraft 104 (Block 11), and is shown 
schematically in figure 2. 
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Note: 
Engines located on 
Fuel propellant Oxidizer reverse side of 
SMRCS valvesa isolation v a l v e s , ,  iso ation panel 
secondary Helium 
P rope1 Ian t isolation 
fuel Pressure In- l ine valves 
Forward 'V 
Figure 1. - The SM RCS panel assembly (Block 11). 
KEY 
ccw = Counterclock 
CW = Clockwire 
HEL =Hel ium 
ISOL lsolatloll 
MANF ~ Mansfold 
CCW - R  
Figure 2. - Schematic of the SM RCS (Block 11). 
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Functional Description of the SM RCS 
In each SM RCS assembly, the helium pressurant was stored in a spherical 
titanium-alloy tank. Initially, the tank was loaded to a pressure of approximately 
4100 psia. The helium flowed from the storage tank to the helium isolation valves, 
which were two-way solenoid valves that were latched open magnetically and that were 
spring-loaded closed. Each isolation valve contained a position indicator switch that 
was used to notify the crewmen regarding the valve position. The high-pressure helium 
was regulated to the desired working pressure (181 psia) by means of parallel regulator 
units. Each unit contained two nearly identical pressure regulators that operated in 
series. Either of the parallel regulator units was capable of providing helium for sys- 
tem operation, thereby providing a redundant flow path in case of a failed-closed regu- 
lator. Series regulators were used in each unit to preclude overpressurization because 
of a failed-open regulator. The regulator helium outlet lines were joined at a common 
point, from which the flow was divided again; thereby, pressurant was supplied to the 
fuel and oxidizer tanks. 
The fuel and the oxidizer were pressurized by means of a common regulator sys- 
tem that maintained the desired oxidizer to fuel (O/F) ratio. Series-parallel check 
valves were placed between the common point in the line and the fuel and oxidizer tanks. 
These valves were used to preclude backflow and subsequent mixing of any significant 
quantities of vaporized hypergolic propellants that might permeate the tank bladders. 
The series-parallel arrangement was used to guard against the ''open" or "closed" 
failure of any single check valve poppet. 
Pressure  relief valves were placed between the check valves and the propellant 
tanks to prevent tank overpressure damage that might be caused by thermal expansion. 
The series-regulator arrangement precluded overpressures caused by regulator leak- 
age. In retrospect, it would have been wise to have sized the relief valve to handle the 
flow from both failed "open" ser ies  regulators rather than to handle only thermal ex- 
pansion overpressures; the only penalty involved would have been a slight size increase. 
The relief valve had two sections. A burst diaphragm was used to provide a positive 
seal  under normal operating conditions. If an overpressure condition occurred, the 
burst diaphragm would have been ruptured and the pressure applied to the relief poppet. 
The rupture pressure of the burst diaphragm w a s  between 220 and 236 psid. Control of 
rupture pressure was maintained by the adjustment of a belleville washer preload on 
each unit. Relief poppet cracking pressure was between 225 and 248 psid, and minimum 
reseat pressure was 220 psid. A vent valve was installed between the burst diaphragm 
and the relief poppet to preclude rendering the burst diaphragm ineffective because of a 
downstream pressure buildup if a small burst diaphragm leak occurred. The vent valve 
closed automatically when flow through the valve was  sufficient to produce a pressure 
differential of 30 psid. 
The fuel and oxidizer systems were identical. Each tank consisted of an outer 
titanium-alloy shell, a Teflon bladder, and an aluminum standpipe. Helium pressurant 
entered the tank between the metal shell and the Teflon bladder, collapsed the bladder, 
and forced the propellant out of the bladder through the aluminum standpipe. This 
arrangement resulted in the capability for positive propellant expulsion in the zero- 
gravity environment of space. A vent tube was installed inside the standpipe to facilitate 
servicing of any vertical tank. The vent tube provided a path through which gas trapped 
inside the bladder could escape when it w a s  being displaced by propellant. Horizontally 
mounted tanks had to be vacuum serviced. 
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Initially, each SM RCS quad had two propellant tanks: one fuel tank and one oxi- 
dizer tank. Both tanks were mounted vertically. Two additional tanks were installed 
when propellant requirements were defined more accurately. Spacecraft 101 (Apollo 7, 
the first Block I1 configuration) was the f i rs t  spacecraft equipped with the two additional 
tanks, which were of the CM type and wer-e smaller than the two existing SM-type tanks. 
The additional oxidizer tank was mounted vertically. The added fuel tank, how- 
ever,  had to be mounted horizontally because of space limitations. The horizontally 
mounted tank had to be vacuum filled. The fill and drain ports that were necessary fGr 
servicing the propellants were located in the lines just downstream from the tanks. A 
propellant isolation valve, which was normally open, was farther downstream f rom 
each tank. Initially, propellants were loaded only to the point of the closed isolation 
valves. Before launch, the isolation valves were opened. These valves were two-way 
solenoid valves that were latched oeen magnetically and spring-loaded closed. As was 
the case fo r  the helium isolation valves, each propellant isolation valve contained a 
position indicator switch that indicated the valve position to the crewmen. Before 
spacecraft 104 was built, the only means of propellant management was by opening or 
closing of the propellant isolation valves. On spacecraft 104, a secondary-fuel-tank 
helium isolation valve, identical to the existing helium isolation valve, was  added just 
upstream from each smaller fuel tank. Normally, the new valve was closed, and it 
was intended to be opened only when the fuel in the primary tank was depleted. Fuel 
depletion was  indicated by a drop in the fuel line pressure.  This method constituted 
a one-point check on propellant gaging a t  the cri t ical  switchover point. 
In-line fi l ters,  added late in  the development program, were located in  each pro- 
pellant manifold downstream from the isolation valves and upstream from each engine 
cluster.  The f i l ters  were designed to prevent fuel and oxidizer contaminants from 
entering the engine valves or  injectors. 
Each of the four engines on each SM quad was a pulse-modulated, radiation- 
cooled, 100-pound thruster.  Major engine components included two solenoid-operated 
propellant injection valves, an injector, a combustion chamber, and a nozzle skirt .  A 
c ross  section of the SM RCS engine assembly is shown in figure 3.  Each engine valve 
had two coils, each of which was capable of actuating the armature poppet to  the "open" 
position. The poppet was spring-loaded closed. A coarse fi l ter  screen (strainer) and 
a t r im  orifice were located in the inlet port of each valve. The filter screen w a s  added 
late in  the engine development program. Each valve was attached to the injector by 
means of an insulating standoff to prevent overheating of the valve. Valve response was 
such that the time between the electrical "on" signal to the full "open" position was  
9 milliseconds for both valves. The injector that was used on each engine had an 
8 doublet main flow pattern; fuel cooling flow of the combustion chamber wall and a 
preigniter chamber, which was a par t  of the injector, was provided. The preigniter 
was incorporated to reduce the magnitude of an ignition overpressure problem; how- 
ever,  the most recent tes ts  indicate that the engines operated satisfactorily without 
preigniter chambers. The combustion chambers that were used on the engines were 
made of machined molybdenum forgings which were coated with molybdenum disilicide 
to prevent molybdenum oxidation at high temperatures.  The one-piece molybdenum 
forgings extended to a nozzle expansion area ratio of 7 : 1. The nozzle skir t ,  which was 
made of a spun cobalt-base alloy, extended to an area ratio of 40: 1. 
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No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
__ 
- 
I 17 
Equipment 
1 Thermal insulator 
Trim ori f ice 
Strainer 
Valve body 
Automatic coi l  
Direct coi l  
P lug 
Spring 
Armature 
Valve seat assembly 
Fuel valve attach bolts 
Oxidizer valve attach bolts 
I niector housina 
Description 
CRES 304 
CRES 316, 321, 347 
CRES 446, MIL-E-21562. 
type MIL-EN6A Weld rod 
CRES 446 
I nconel X 
CRES 446 with Stellite t ip 
A M  355 with Teflon TFE seal 
6AL-4V t i tan ium 
CRES A286 
606116 a luminum 
1 No. I Equipment 
13 I :: Oxidizer preigniter tube Fuel preigniter tube Preigniter insert Preigniter chamber l! 23 Seal Split r ing Attach r ing Attach bolts Combustion chamber Nozzle sk i r t  
Nozzle attach n u t  
Description 
CRES A286 
CRES A286 
CRES A286 
Plastic laminate 
L605 cobalt-base alloy 
Rene 41 
l iene 41 
Rene 41 
Unalloyed molybdenum, 
disilicide coated 
L605 cobalt-base alloy 
WASPALOY 
Figure 3. - Cross section of the SM RCS engine assembly (spacecraft 011 
and subsequent vehicles). 
To ensure that the engines operated within a safe temperature range, the structure 
to which the engines were attached was heated. To supply heat, two 72-watt, thermo- 
statically controlled s t r ip  heater assemblies were bonded to the structure. Although 
two assemblies were installed, only one was active; the other was available but was 
held in reserve.  
In addition to the i tems just described, each system had many access ports for 
use  in checkout and servicing. Each access port was provided with redundant closures 
to prevent any overboard leakage and with inlet f i l ters to protect against externally 
introduced contamination. 
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Operational instrumentation was limited to several  of the major parameters.  The 
following measurements were displayed on board the SM RCS or  were telemetered to 
the ground. 
1. Helium source pressure 
2. Helium source temperature 
3. Propellant quantity 
4. Engine cluster temperature 
5. Fuel manifold pressure 
6. Oxidizer manifold pressure 
7.  Helium regulated pressure 
The propellant quantity measurement was a temperature-compensated, helium source 
pressure measurement that was calibrated to read out the number of pounds of remain- 
ing propellant. This measurement (known as the onboard pressure/temperature (P/T) 
sensor) was displayed in the spacecraft and also was telemetered to the ground. A 
second propellant quantity measurement was computed a t  ground stations by the use  of 
a helium mass balance equation (pressure volume temperature (PVT) computer pro- 
gram) to calculate the quantity of remaining propellant. This procedure was performed 
on the ground and was  known as the PVT ground computer program. 
The P/T sensor propellant values, which supplied propellant quantity data as a 
function of helium tank pressure and temperature, were displayed in the vehicle in 
te rms  of percent full scale of a 0- to 5-volt meter; also, the data were telemetered. 
The output of the P/T sensor was calibrated to read 100 percent when the helium tank 
pressure was 4150 psia a t  70" F, and to read 0 percent when the pressure was 
2250 psia a t  70" F. The correct theoretical value of helium tank pressure a t  propellant 
depletion was 2450 psia at 65" F. Later, a nomogram was used to correct the P/T 
sensor readings for this endpoint e r ro r ,  compressibility effects, system temperature 
variability, and propellant vapor pressure effects. 
Pressure,  volume, and temperature considerations a t  an average mission O/F 
ratio of 1.88 were used in the PVT ground computer program. The quoted accuracy of 
the PVT ground computer values was only +6 percent because of instrumentation in- 
accuracies in the computer input. However, the PVT ground computer program Values 
were assumed to  be more nearly correct than were the onboard P/T sensor values. 
The input involved volumes and propellant loads, O/F shift, and the differential between 
helium tank and propellant tank ullage temperatures.  
In addition to these measurements, the isolation valve positions were displayed to 
the crewmen. 
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Funct ional  Descript ion of the CM RCS 
The CM RCS was similar to the SM RCS. The CM had two, rather than four, 
independent assemblies. Each assembly had the total capability that was  required to 
provide entry control. The propellant f rom both CM assemblies was  required only if 
a hybrid deorbit were needed. 
The CM RCS had pyrotechnic helium isolation valves rather than solenoid valves. 
Normally, the pyrotechnic valves were closed, and were opened just before entry. Once 
the valves were opened, no provision was made for isolating the helium supply. 
Each CM RCS propellant tank had a helium bypass line for  use in depleting excess 
helium before landing. Normally, the flow was shut off by means of a pyrotechnic valve 
in each bypass line. The line was opened only after the propellant depletion burn was 
completed . 
To provide positive sealing of the system before use, burst-disk-type isolation 
valves were installed in the propellant feedlines between the tanks and the solenoid-type 
propellant isolation valves. The burst disks were designed to rupture at a pressure of 
241 f 14 psid. 
A major difference between the CM RCS and SM RCS was the type of engines that 
were used. The SM engines were radiation-cooled, unlimited life engines (from a burn 
time standpoint). The CM engines were ablatively cooled, limited life engines and were 
used in a buried application. Although the same major components were used in both the 
CM and SM engines, some component configurations were significantly different. The 
CM engine valves were similar to the SM engine valves. Tighter clearances and the 
lack of armature flutes made the CM engines somewhat more difficult to decontaminate. 
The injectors on the CM engines were of the 16 doublet splash plate type. The major 
difference between the CM and SM engines was the combustion chambers. Because the 
CM engines were buried in the CM skip, ablative chambers were used. The inner sec- 
tion of each engine was a 6" wrap ablative sleeve with a JTA (graphite refractory) 
throat insert. The sleeve and the throat in the CM engines were 45" wrapped ablative 
material, which, in turn, was covered by a fiber glass overwrap and an outer stainless 
s teel  can. Each engine extended to an expansio? a r e a  ratio of 9:l. An ablative nozzle 
extension, which was contoured to the exterior surface of the spacecraft, provided for 
only limited additional expansion. The 45" wrap and the 9:1 expansion that were used 
on the Apollo thrusters  were significant changes from the 90" wrap and the 40:l expan- 
sion which were used initially on the Gemini 100-pound thrusters.  Although these 
changes represented a departure f rom the intent of using the same design on the Gemini 
spacecraft and on the Apollo CM, the improvement in product reliability and entry heat- 
ing problems warranted the changes. 
During the development program, both the Gemini and Apollo engines experienced 
lamination separation and subsequent outer shell burnthrough. A supporting research 
contractor (managed by the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC)) determined that 6" wrap 
ablative material  did not undergo the same burnthrough. Based on this information, the 
Apollo engine billet was changed to a 45" wrap, and the redesign also included a 6" 
inner sleeve within the 45" billet. These changes in  the Apollo engines resolved the 
burnthrough problems. It should be noted that, subsequently, the ablative wrap on the 
Gemini engines was changed to 6". The Gemini 100-pound engines were not used on 
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the entry vehicle, and heating that was caused by the large exit area was not a problem 
for Gemini. The change f rom the Gemini 40: 1 expansion ratio to the Apollo 9: 1 ratio 
sacrificed some performance but resulted in a significant reduction in  entry heating. 
In addition to the ablative burnthrough problems during development, the Gemini 
and Apollo engines underwent unacceptable chamber streaking. Fortunately, the cause 
of this problem was found during injector flow investigations that were conducted at the 
MSC Thermochemical Test  Area (TTA) on an Apollo test art icle.  The initial corrective 
action involved the screening of injectors and the rejection of those that had poor flow 
patterns. Ultimately, the misalined injector flow passages were alined properly during 
manufacturing, and streaking was  eliminated, which obviated the need for screening. 
(At the point in the program that these two problems occurred, the program expenditure 
ra tes  were high. Thus, the supporting development and in-house test  evaluation contri- 
butions to the Apollo Program cannot be overemphasized. ) 
To provide redundant flow paths for helium and propellant depletion before land- 
ing, interconnect lines and pyrotechnic valves (closed normally) were used between the 
two CM assemblies. Additionally, an abort propellant and helium dump capability was 
provided by means of fuel and oxidizer dump valves and helium bypass valves in  each 
CM assembly. The valves were pyrotechnically operated and normally closed. The 
overboard dump provisions were to be used only in  the event of an abort from the launch 
pad during the f i r s t  42 seconds of a mission. As  did the SM RCS, the CM RCS had the 
necessary access ports f o r  the performance of checkout and servicing procedures. 
Operational instrumentation was more limited on the CM than on the SM. The 
parameters measured on the CM included helium source pressure,  helium source tem- 
perature, and helium regulated pressure.  
As on the SM, the propellant isolation valve positions were displayed to the crew- 
men. Although no formal propellant quantity gaging system was used, propellant quan- 
tity could be calculated by the use of a helium mass  balance equation. 
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 
From an economic standpoint, it was desirable to use off-the-shelf, readily avail- 
able components wherever possible. However, because of the unique requirements of 
most systems, including the command and service module (CSM) RCS, use of these 
components was not feasible. Although none of the components were off-the-shelf items, 
most of them were state of the a r t .  For  the state-of-the-art components, the develop- 
ment program was  rather straightforward and usually consisted of (1) a sufficient num- 
ber of tests of preprototype hardware to define the design, (2) a design verification test  
of prototype hardware to verify design adequacy, and (3)  qualification tes ts  to demon- 
s t ra te  formally the adequacy of production hardware. 
It should be noted that the qualification program was intended to demonstrate 
formally not only the hardware design adequacy but also the adequancy and Consistency 
of the manufacturing procedure. 
In addition to the component tes ts ,  a considerable number of SyStem-leVel tes ts  
were conducted. Several of the system-level tes ts  constituted a par t  of the formal  
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Certification Test Network (the test demonstration program through which Apollo space- 
craft hardware was formally verified as acceptable for manned space flight). The 
system-level evaluations included system performance demonstration tests, vibration 
tolerance demonstration tests,  and thermal vacuum tests  (to verify thermal control sys- 
tem adequacy). 
Several CM RCS and SM RCS performance tes ts  were conducted to support the 
Block I (early spacecraft configuration) vehicles as well as the Block I1 (space- 
craft 101 and subsequent) vehicles. The tes ts  were divided into three major phases for 
both the CM and the SM systems. These tes ts  began in March 1963 and were completed 
in March 1968. 
Command Module RCS Tests 
Phase I. - The Phase I Block I breadboard tes ts  were conducted on the CM from 
March to September 1963. The objectives of the tes t s  were to evaluate the following 
circumstances by the use of cold flow techniques. 
1. The effect of steady-state and pulse-mode single-engine and multiengine op- 
eration on system dynamics 
2. Propellant tank bladder efficiency in a system operating environment 
Test hardware consisted almost entirely of off-the-shelf components. Results indicated 
that no major system dynamics problems should be anticipated. Although some com- 
ponent problems occurred, these problems were not considered significant because the 
hardware was not representative of any flight configuration. 
Phase 11. - The Phase I1 Block I breadboard tes ts  were conducted from Septem- 
ber  1 9 m l y  1964. The test  objectives were to determine the following by the use 
of cold flow and live propellant tests.  
1. The effect of engine duty cycle on system dynamics and the converse 
2. Pad abort  dump performance characteristics 
3. System operations during all mission activities 
The objectives of these tests were met. An overpressure that occurred during system 
activation resulted in a relief valve burst disk rupture. The corrective action consisted 
of the installation of 0. 070-inch-diameter orifices upstream from the regulators. The 
effectiveness of this installation was scheduled for evaluation on subsequent breadboard 
testing. Additionally, system decontamination w a s  performed and results were 
evaluated. 
Phase 111. - The Phase I11 Block I breadboard tests were conducted from Septem- 
ber 1965 to November 1966. These tes ts  were the formal performance demonstrations 
that resulted in certification of the systems for flight. 
mission duty cycle or flight hardware (or  both), a lengthy ser ies  of tests was  conducted. 
Because of differences in the 
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The f i r s t  test  was a spacecraft 009 mission duty cycle. The objective was  to 
certify the spacecraft 009 system by mission simulation. Two significant system short- 
comings required corrective action. One shortcoming involved the inadvertent closure 
of the propellant isolation valves at the time of system activation. The other short- 
coming involved a recurrence of relief valve burst disk rupture because of regulator 
overshoot. A short-term solution of the isolation valve problem was the application of 
continuous power to the valve during activation. The long-range solution was to re- 
design the valve flow path to  make it insensitive to flow surges.  The solution of the 
regulator overshoot problem was to limit flow surges by reducing the diameter of the 
orifice from 0.070 to 0.055 inch. 
The next tes ts  were in support of spacecraft 012, and the tes ts  included a pad 
abort simulation and a mission duty cycle demonstration. The objectives of the pad 
abort simulation were to demonstrate system activation and subsequent oxidizer and 
helium dumps. The times for  oxidizer and helium dumps exceeded the anticipated V a l -  
ues. Subsequently, bladder folds were found to cause flow obstruction, which increased 
the time of the oxidizer dump. Although the dump time was  longer than anticipated, the 
time was sti l l  acceptable; thus, no hardware change was required. The excessive he- 
lium depletion time was caused by an instrumentation fitting that obstructed the flow 
path. This instrumentation was not on flight hardware; therefore, a recurrence of this 
problem was not anticipated. 
The objectives of the spacecraft 012 mission duty cycle demonstration included 
the following specific objectives. 
1. To verify the adequacy of the regulator orifice change from a diameter of 
0.070 to  0.055 inch 
2. To verify the adequacy of the redesigned propellant valves 
3. To verify the adequacy of the pressure volume technique for checking pro- 
pellant load 
All objectives were met, except the verification of the adequacy of the regulator orifice 
change. The tests indicated that the regulator overshoot was st i l l  sufficient to rupture 
the relief valve burst disk. After extensive evaluation of the problem, it was decided 
not to change the Block I configuration, but rather to wait for an in-line change in the 
Block I1 configuration because burst disk rupture did not degrade system performance, 
and system reliability was compromised only slightly. 
One other significant Block I configuration CM RCS test  se r ies  was conducted from 
April 1964 to  September 1965. The primary objective of the se r i e s  was to evaluate the 
operational servicing techniques and checkout procedures at the John F. Kennedy Space 
Center (KSC). The ser ies  was considered valuable because procedures and techniques 
were developed on other than flight hardware without the pressures  of flight schedules. 
The final CM RCS ground test  was the Block I1 configuration certification test 
Series that was conducted from January to March 1967. The specific objectives of the 
s e r i e s  were to demonstrate the Block I1 mission duty cycle and the pad abort 
capabilities. 
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The results of the test were satisfactory. Rerouting the lines to the relief valve 
eliminated the relief valve burst disk rupture upon system activation. One problem 
that was revealed during a helium purge w a s  a pressure recovery (to 200 psia) in the 
manifold 30 seconds after purge. The test proved that the manifold repressurization 
was caused by a slow release of trapped gas from the propellant tanks. The gas was 
trapped in the tank by an abrasion pad (over the helium inlet) that acted as a check 
valve. The problem was resolved on spacecraft 103 by cutting holes in the abrasion 
pad. 
Service Module RCS Tests 
Phase I. - The Phase I Block I breadboard tests were conducted on the SM RCS 
from March to June 1963, and the tests paralleled closely the CM RCS tests. The 
objective of the tests was to explore system dynamics. No significant problems were 
noted. 
Phase 11.- The Phase 11 Block I tests were conducted from April 1964 to July 1965. 
The objectives of the tests were as follows. 
1. To develop checkout procedures 
2. To determine system f i l l  and drain techniques 
3. To verify system performance characteristics 
Three significant problems were noted during the tests. First, a nuclear gaging 
device that was under development for this system was very sensitive to temperature 
variations; additional Phase I1 Block I component development was required so that the 
nuclear gaging system could be used, Second, the standoff tubes in the upward-firing 
engines were damaged during firing. The standoff tubes were strengthened, but with 
limited success, and it was apparent that sea-level firing of engines with the nozzle 
pointed upward was unsatisfactory. Residual propellant collected in the standoff tubes, 
and overpressure damage occurred during subsequent firing. Third, the Block I com- 
ponents in the helium pressurization assembly were degraded seriously because of 
incompatibility of the assembly with the propellant vapors that moved upstream. The 
only realistic solution to this problem was to construct the Phase I1 Block I components 
from materials that would be compatible with the propellants. When this was accom- 
plished, the system propellant exposure durations were increased satisfactorily. The 
wisdom of this decision became increasingly evident, because the required system pro- 
pellant exposure times continually increased throughout the program. 
Phase 111. - The Phase I11 Block I breadboard tests were started in November 1965 
and were completed in December 1966. A s  with the CM Phase I11 tests,  the tests were 
formal and were conducted to certify the system for flight. Both spacecraft 009 and012 
duty cycles were rim. In addition to duty cycle simulation, the spacecraft 012 test had 
propellant gaging system evaluation as a primary objective. The results of earlier 
tests had indicated that the nuclear gaging system still had major development problems 
which had to be resolved, and furthermore, a PVT gaging system could be used with 
greater accuracy. The PVT gaging systems that were used involved ground-computed 
quantities as the primary gaging technique and an onboard nomogram as a backup gaging 
method. 
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The Block I1 SM RCS was certified in two ser ies  of tests. The first ser ies  of 
tes ts  was conducted in support of spacecraft 101 and 103 from December 1966 to 
March 1967. The objectives of the tests were as follows. 
1. To demonstrate a lunar landing mission duty cycle capability 
2. To certify the PVT ground computer program and the onboard P/T sensor 
gaging techniques for flight 
3. To certify the servicing procedures for the Block I1 configuration with the use 
of additional propellant tanks 
The test  results indicated that the mission duty cycle objective was met easily. 
The servicing procedures with the use of the additional tanks also presented no major 
problem. The onboard P/T sensor technique proved to be considerably more inaccurate 
than was anticipated. To reduce inaccuracy to a maximum of 10 percent, a nomogram 
would be needed to correct for  temperature variations. The PVT ground computer pro- 
gram was proved to be more accurate than the onboard P/T sensor technique. 
One additional problem involved burst disk rupture a t  the time of system activa- 
tion. This problem was  similar to the difficulty that was encountered on the CM. The 
proposed solution, similar to that for the CM, was to reroute the helium lines. The 
change was to be incorporated on spacecraft 102, 104, 106, and subsequent vehicles and 
was  to be certified on the test  art icle for those vehicles. Tests  of this hardware were 
begun in January 1967 and were completed in March 1968. In addition to the require- 
ment for certification of the rerouting of the helium lines, the objectives of this test  
were as follows. 
1. To certify the system operating procedures and the system with the isolation 
valve upstream from the secondary fuel tank 
2. To verify the propellant manifold decontamination procedures 
Generally, the results of the tes ts  were satisfactory. However, some anomalies 
occurred. 
Significant engine chamber pressure oscillations occurred during the primary 
oxidizer tank depletion. The cause of the oscillation was determined to be gas bubbles 
that passed through the engine. The manner by which the bubbles entered the bladder 
was never established completely. Agreement was established that, generally, the 
process involved diffusion of helium through the bladder. A hypothesis (evidenced by 
all testing) was that diffusion of helium through the bladder was accelerated by a dif- 
ferential pressure which was established ac ross  the bladder by the liquid column trapped 
in the standpipe. The liquid was  trapped in the standpipe when the bladder collapsed 
around the standpipe as the propellant was depleted. Because a differential pressure 
caused by a liquid head could exist only in a gravity environment, the consensus was  
that this problem would not exist in space. The consensus was not verified because 
primary oxidizer tank depletion did not occur in flight. 
The inadvertent opening of the secondary propellant isolation valves caused a loss 
of oxidizer tank ullage as a result  of gravity f i l l  f rom the primary tank. The loss of 
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ullage was cri t ical  only if the secondary tank was to be isolated again. Because the 
separation of the primary and secondary oxidizer tanks served no r ea l  purpose, the two 
tanks were connected by means of a small line so that ullage in either tank would 
accommodate propellant expansion. 
In addition to the CSM RCS performance testing by the contractor, several  system 
tests were conducted at the MSC TTA. A CM RCS test was conducted during May and 
June 1967 to determine the operational system characteristics at  altitude conditions. 
(The contractor did not conduct this type of altitude testing. ) Test firing included a 
backup deorbit duty cycle that involved the use of the positive- and negative-pitch en- 
gines. No significant anomalies were encountered during the tests.  
The SM RCS tes t s  were conducted at  the MSC TTA during August and Septem- 
ber 1965 and during November and December 1966. The objectives of the tests were 
as follows. 
1. To determine system operational characteristics a t  altitude conditions 
2. To demonstrate RCS compatibility with the stabilization and control system 
(SCS) in a closed-loop dynamic mission simulation 
No system problems were encountered during any of these tests. An upward- 
firing engine failed, but this failure was attributed to low-altitude and low-temperature 
conditions that retarded vaporization of the residual propellant in the combustion 
chamber. 
System -Leve I V i brat  ion Tests 
System-level vibration tes ts  were conducted on both Block I and Block I1 SM RCS 
panels between November 1965 and April 1967. However, no CM RCS vibration tes ts  
were conducted above the component level. The logic was that the CM RCS had the 
same components as the SM, and the CM requirements were significantly less severe 
than those for  the SM, which was subjected to system-level testing. 
Block I. - In November 1965, a Block I production-type SM RCS panel was sub- 
jected to an acoustic noise level similar to that encountered during spacecraft launch 
and boosted flight. The complete SM RCS test panel was  mounted to simulate space- 
craft installation on a 180" SM segment in a reverberant chamber; after it was mounted, 
the panel was subjected to acoustic noise. The primary test  objective was to verify that 
the system would maintain integrity and function satisfactorily after exposure to severe 
dynamic conditions. The secondary objective was  to measure the dynamic response of 
RCS components exposed to an acoustic noise environment. After this test, the engine 
cluster was mounted on another honeycomb panel and was tested separately at  a higher 
level in the plane-wave section of the MSC Vibration and Acoustic Test Facility. The 
resul ts  of the Block I tes t s  indicated that the structural integrity and function of the 
RCS were not impaired by acoustic testing. 
Block 11. - In April 1967, a Block I1 SM RCS panel was  subjected to vibroacoustic 
tes ts  s imilar  to the tes ts  that were performed on the Block I configuration; the test  re-  
sults were s imilar .  However, no tests were performed on the Block I1 engine cluster 
alone because of the similarity to the Block I engine cluster. 
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System Thermal  Vacuum Tests 
The CSM RCS thermal vacuum tests  above the colr.ponent level were conducted in 
three phases: spacecraft 008 thermal vacuum tests, test vehicle 2TV- 1 thermal vac- 
uum tests, and Block I1 SM RCS panel tests.  
Spacecraft 008 thermal vacuum tests. - Testing of the Block I RCS thermal control 
system was conducted as par t  of the spacecraft 008 integrated vehicle thermal vacuum 
test  program in mid-1966. Thermal control of both the SM RCS and CM RCS was eval- 
uated. The two major objectives of the SM RCS evaluation were as follows. 
1. To verify the adequacy of the thermal control techniques to maintain the sys-  
tem components within acceptable levels 
2. To verify the adequacy of the analytical thermal model 
The test results indicated that with functioning heaters, the component temperatures 
were maintained within acceptable limits. During periods of passive thermal control 
(heaters off), the temperatures were within the predicted range. However, the rates  
of temperature change were higher than were anticipated. 
One significant anomaly was the failure of the bonding material  to hold the heater 
to the engine cluster on the SM RCS quad D. The heater surface was not rough enough 
f o r  the bonding material to adhere properly. The solution of the problem for those 
heaters that were already installed was to clamp the heater in place mechanically; 
clamping was a secondary holding mechanism for use in case of bond failure. For 
heaters not yet installed, an improved heater surface preparation technique was used 
to improve adhesion before bonding. 
The major objective of the CM RCS evaluation was to determine the adequacy of 
the engine heating technique. Test  results proved that before activation, the engine 
valve coil could be used as a heater to cause the injector temperature to rise above a 
safe minimum limit without overheating the valve. 
Test  vehicle 2TV- 1 thermal vacuum tests.  - The test  vehicle 2TV- 1 thermal vac- 
uum tests were conducted from June to October 1968. All Block I1 system-level or  
higher thermal vacuum tests were to  be conducted on spacecraft 98 (test vehicle 2TV-1). 
Because configuration changes were made to the SM RCS late in the program, test  vehi- 
cle 2TV-1 did not have a representative Block I1 SM RCS. The test  vehicle 2TV-1 SM 
RCS tanks were of a Block I configuration, and data generated during the test  could not 
be used to ver i fy  the entire SM RCS mathematical model. A separate panel test was run 
in a different facility for this purpose. However, the test  vehicle 2TV-1 engine cluster 
was in  the Block 11 configuration, and the data indicated that the redesigned engine 
heater system (both primary and secondary) maintained engine components above the 
minimum redline temperatures. Also, the tes t  established values for (1) the tempera- 
ture  differential between the engine and the nozzle during cold soak and rolling phases, 
(2) the temperature response of the engine components to a realist ic simulation of a 
rolling mode, and (3) the SM RCS temperature during a full solar  hot soak. 
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The test vehicle 2TV-1 CM RCS had the proper Block 11 configuration. The test 
objectives were as follows. 
1. To determine the thermal response of the CM RCS to extreme space environ- 
ment conditions 
2. To determine the engine heater warmup response under variable initial 
conditions 
Both objectives were met, and no problems were encountered. 
Block 11 SM RCS panel tests. - Separate Block I1 SM RCS panel tests were con- 
ducted to measure the integrity of the thermal-mathematical model. A production SM 
RCS panel assembly was used for the tests that were conducted at MSC during Febru- 
ary 1968. The mathematical model was necessary because it would be required in real- 
time flight support to evaluate conditions not included in the tests. The test data 
indicated the need for several modifications to the model. Final model updating re- 
sulted in temperature predictions for hot-case conditions of the propellant feed system 
to within 7" F of actual values and for cold-case conditions to within 4"  F of actual 
values. All objectives of this test were achieved. 
Component Certification and Qualification of the CSM RCS 
A certification and qualification test program was conducted for each component 
in the CSM RCS. These tests included a demonstration of the capability to withstand 
exposure to temperature, vacuum, vibration, shock, propellants, and acceleration 
conditions, and demonstrations of operational capability such as functional cycling, 
proof pressure tests, leakage tests, and pressure drop tests. Tests were also con- 
ducted (1) to demonstrate tolerance to particulate contamination and (2) to determine the 
quantity of contaminants generated. Additionally, selected components were tested un- 
der conditions that were more severe than those which were expected during flight, in- 
cluding vibration to 1 . 5  times the normal qualification levels and pressurization to the 
component burst point. The test results that  were the basis for hardware modifications 
or operational limitations a r e  given in the following paragraphs. 
Test point disconnect coupling. - Only one significant problem occurred with the 
test point disconnect coupling during qualification. One unit required the use of an 
engagement torque in excess of that allowed by specification because of a failed thrust 
washer. The unit was modified by the inclusion of a Rulon bearing to carry the axial 
loads. The location of the bearing is shown in figure 4. 
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Ground half C oupli 
R ulon bearing 
,Airbor 5 half coupling 
Figure 4. - The CSM RCS test point disconnect coupling. 
Helium f i l l  disconnect coupling. - During testing, excessive leakage in the helium 
f i l l  disconnect coupling occurred at  -150" F. Corrective action included a change in 
the probe seal material from fluorinated ethylene propylene (FEP) Teflon to Kel-F-81, 
and a design and material change in the probe seal  spacers.  The probe seal spacer 
material was changed from aluminum to AIS1 303 stainless steel. Also, the configura- 
tion w a s  changed so  that correct alinement of the ground half probe would be ensured as 
it entered the airborne half coupling (fig. 5). 
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A I S 1  303 stainless 
steel probe 
seal spacer 
rnd half probe 
-81 probe seal 
half coupling 
half coupling 
Figure 5. - The CSM RCS helium f i l l  
disconnect coupling. 
Helium regulator units. - The only 
significant problem that occurred during the 
certification testing of the helium regula- 
tor units was the tendency of some units 
to undergo outlet pressure fluctuations a t  
a frequency of approximately 500 hertz. 
Because these fluctuations did not violate 
the regulated pressure tolerance bands 
during certification, no remedial action 
was taken. Subsequently, oscillations oc- 
curred in several units during system- 
and vehicle- level checkout, and occasionally 
caused out-of-tolerance regulated pres- 
sures. These units were not rejected but 
waivers were granted because the oscilla- 
tions occurred at the time that the regula- 
tor inlet pressures were below normal. 
Helium check valve assemblies. - Sev- 
eral  failures occurred in helium check valve 
assemblies because of out-of-tolerance 
internal leakage. Most cases were attrib- 
uted to particulate contamination, and, in 
some instances, the units were flushed, 
retested, and found to be acceptable. Be- 
cause of the nature of these failures, no 
corrective action was taken at the time of 
qualification. However, as assembly and 
checkout of the vehicles progressed, the 
large number of check valve leakage fail- 
ures that were attributed to particulate 
contamination of the seats required cor- 
rective action. The correction involved 
a check valve modification to add fi l ters 
at the valve inlets. This modification was 
made on spacecraft 101 for the SM RCS 
and on spacecraft 104 for the CM RCS 
(fig. 6). 
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Note Both oxidizer and fuel side configurations 
are shown on one assembly for ease of presentation 
A serious compatibility problem between the soft butyl rubber poppet sea l  mate- 
rial and the oxidizer was  noted during the certification tests.  The problem was mani- 
fested by internal seal  leakage. The seal material  for  the check valve on the oxidizer 
side w a s  changed to a nitroso rubber compound on spacecraft 012 and subsequent vehi- 
cles. Additional compatibility tes ts  were conducted to certify the new material. At 
the same time, the valve seal  material for the fuel side was changed to ethylene pro- 
pylene rubber (EPR) to eliminate the difficult process of adding a Teflon coating to the 
poppet seats, a process that was  necessary previously because of the tendency of the 
original seal material to adhere to the bare  metal seats.  This change was certified by 
means of additional compatibility tests.  It should be noted that the modifications did not 
result in complete solution of the compatibility problems. Later,  i t  was  noted that these 
new materials were sensitive to the Freon and isopropyl alcohol (IPA) cleaning fluids. 
(In future space programs, all materials should be compatible with all fluids to be used 
in the system. ) The use of IPA (in this case) caused the EPR to swell. The swelling 
could have been controlled by limitation of the exposure time, but the IPA flushing was 
eliminated. At the same time, i t  w a s  discovered that Freon flushing fluids that were 
applied to the nitroso rubber compound caused stickiness and deterioration because the 
binders were leached by the Freon. A technique fo r  preleaching the nitroso rubber 
compound w a s  included in the manufacturing process.  The use of this technique im- 
proved the material significantly, but did not eliminate the problem of stickiness. Dur- 
ing the long-term compatibility tes ts  and the qualification verification tes ts ,  the nitroso 
I rubber compound was degraded by exposure to nitrogen tetroxide. 
Figure 6. - The CSM RCS helium check valve. 
20 
Helium pressure relief valves. - Helium pressure relief valve failures that would 
require hardware modification did not occur during qualification tests. However, on 
several occasions, the burst disk ruptured at a pressure that w a s  greater than the max- 
imum allowable level. This resulted in a change to the burst pressure level that is set 
during assembly. 
After several  cases of corrosion caused by moisture were evidenced on the ex- 
ternal side of relief valves, a sealing device was added to exclude atmospheric mois- 
ture. The device was  an adhesive seal  that was pasted over the vent port opening. In 
case of the relief valve actuation, the device was designed to blow off. The device was 
reasonably effective, provided it was installed carefully and was used properly. The 
relief valve changes a r e  indicated in figure 7. 
Figure 7.- The SM RCS helium pressure 
relief valve. 
Burst disk assembly. - Five significant 
problems occurred during certification tests 
of the burst disk assembly. The internal 
filter screens were damaged during burst 
disk actuation. The problem was corrected 
by adding a stop that was  integrated with the 
closure plug to prevent the burst disk from 
contacting the screen. Degradation of the 
burst disk Teflon coating occurred after the 
nitrogen tetroxide exposure tests. In most 
cases, the coating bond was destroyed to 
varying extents by nitrogen tetroxide, which 
resulted in the deletion of the Teflon coating 
from the oxidizer burst disks. Initially, the 
coating was added to increase tolerance to 
the water in the propellant. After deletion 
of the Teflon coating, propellant water con- 
tent in excess of specification could not be 
tolerated. 
Extrusion of the external seal material 
was a problem that necessitated a redesign 
of the closure plug to contain completely the 
exterior O-ring seal. Another problem was. 
exterior leakage of the burst disk seals; this 
problem required a change of the seal  com- 
pound from 722-3 to 722-2 nitroso rubber 
compound. Additionally, low rupture pres- 
sures were detected on the oxidizer burst 
disks after propellant exposure tests were 
conducted. The cause of these low pressures 
was not determined; no corrective action was 
initiated. This problem recurred after the 
90-day propellant compatibility testing, but, 
again, no cause could be determined and no corrective-action was taken, because the 
decrease in rupture pressure was  small and no adverse operational effects resulted. 
Two views of the burst disk assembly a r e  shown in figure 8. 
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Figure 8. - The CM RCS burst disk 
assembly. 
Propellant tanks. - A limited number 
of certification tes ts  were completed for 
the spacecraft 009 propellant tanks (fig. 9). 
Additional propellant tank tes ts  were com- 
pleted in support of spacecraft 011, 012, 
and 103. The tests for the spacecraft 103 
propellant tanks were conducted to certify 
a modification to the bladder flange buffer 
pad. Holes were punched in these pads to 
allow for more rapid depressurization dur- 
ing the CM RCS purge operation. 
During numerous attempts at  propel- 
lant tank qualification, significant problems 
that resulted in hardware changes o r  changes 
in operating procedures were encountered. 
The problems were divided into two cate- 
gories. One category involved tank shell 
compatibility; the other category involved 
mechanical failure of the bladder. 
A serious problem was encountered 
during propellant tank compatibility tests.  
After a relatively short  period of exposure, 
one of the oxidizer tanks began to leak. An 
additional group of tanks was  subjected to 
s imilar  exposure tests. The rupture of the 
tanks that were subjected to pressure began 
to  occur after relatively little exposure. 
After extensive investigation, it was deter- 
mined that a lack of nitrous oxide in the 
nitrogen tetroxide caused rapid s t r e s s  cor- 
rosion of the titanium alloy. The oxidizer 
that had been used ear l ier  in the program 
had been manufactured without control of 
the nitrous oxide content. In 1964, in an effort to improve the uniformity of the propel- 
lant, the U. S. A i r  Force reduced the previously allowable amount of nitrous oxide con- 
tent to zero. The compatibility test failures occurred while this oxidizer was being 
used. Therefore, the problem was not evident earlier in the Apollo Program o r  during 
the Gemini Program. The corrective action was to  specify and control the nitrous oxide 
quantity in the nitrogen tetroxide between 0.4 to 0.8 percent by weight. Once this cor- 
rective action was taken, no further stress corrosion problems with the oxidizer were 
encountered. However, the investigative effort resulted in the use  of the fracture  
mechanics theory on al l  Apollo pressure vessels.  Briefly stated, this theory is that 
flaw growth (to failure) in a pressure vessel  can be predicted by using empirical data 
on the vessel material and the vessel  p ressure  history, The application of these tech- 
niques to the Apollo pressure vessels is described in reference 1. 
The bladders on the Apollo tanks were changed f rom the independent-ply construc- 
tion (used on Gemini tanks) to a laminated single-ply construction to preclude using 
bladders that had inner-ply failures which were not in evidence during checkout. The 
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Equipment 
Out let tu be 
Bolt 
Liquid side vent tube 
Diffuser tube 
Flange 
Retainer 
Bladder 
Ring 
Gasket 
Bolt 
Fit t ing 
Washer 
- 
No. 
1 
- Description No Equipment 
CRES 347 13 Nut 
Titanium 14 Gasket 
CRES 347 16 Nut  
6061 a luminum 17 Washer 
6061 a luminum 18 Shell 
6061-16 a luminum 19 Nut  date 
Teflon TFEIFEP 20 V e n t c o r d  
6061 aluminurn 21 Flanged eyelet 
Teflon TFE 22 Pad 
CRES 347 23 Pad 
CRES M4L 
CRES 347 15 Gasket 
2 
3 
11 
12 
Description -kG-i 
I Teflon TFE I 
Teflon TFE 
CRES 347 
6061-16 a luminum 
Titanium 
CRES A286 
Teflon TFE 
CRES M 4  
Teflon TFEIFEP 
Teflon TFE 
Figure 9. - Typical CSM RCS propellant tank. 
inner-ply failures caused the propellant to become trapped between plies. Bladder 
cycle life was  a recognized problem. During propellant servicing, the repositioning of 
previously twisted bladders caused high stresses on tank bladders, and failures oc- 
curred after relatively few cycles. Corrective action included the prepositioning of the 
empty bladders and the installation of the vent tubes s o  that the gas could be vented as 
propellant was  added. The vent tubes reduced the cycle life problems in the tanks that 1 
were serviced in the vertical position, but were of little value for service to the hori- 
zontal tanks. In an effort to solve the bladder s t r e s s  problem during service of the 
horizontal propellant tanks, the highly stressed ends. of the oxidizer bladders were 
thickened. All these corrective actions were helpful in meeting cycle life requirements. 
However, the cycle life requirements eventually had to be reduced significantly. Ad- 
ditionally, the service procedure was modified f o r  the horizontal tanks to ensure that 
the tanks were never completely filled. High stressing was prevented by eliminating 
the last phase of bladder repositioning by limiting the oxidizer amount to 96 percent. 
One further bladder problem involved chafing of the bladder ends during vibration. Cor- 
rective action consisted of the addition of a Teflon buffer between the tank and bladder 
pads at the ends of each bladder. 
The CM RCS engine. - Several problems occurred in the CM RCS engine (fig. 10) 
during qualification, and changes were required. Spalling of the JTA throat insert 
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(a) Valve assembly. 
during the humidity and salt  fog exposure 
tests required corrective action that included 
an increase in the minimum allowable throat 
insert  density, the addition of protective 
covers to the engine outlets, and the applica- 
tion of epoxy to the engine throats. 
Particulate generation occurred during 
random vibration tes ts  and induced valve 
seat leakage. It was  necessary to coat the 
engine chambers and thxoats with epoxy to 
control the particulate generation that 
caused valve seat leakage. 
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Trim ori f ice 
Filler 
Inlet housing 
Valve body (bobbin) 
Core 
Spring 
Armature 
Valve seat assembly 
Automatic coi l  
Direct co i l  
Leadwire housing 
Leadwires 
Fuel manifold 
Oxidizer manifold 
Injector assembly 
- 17 
Descriotion 
CRES 17-7PH 
CRES M4L. 321. 347 
CRES 17-7PH 
CRES 321, 430F 
CRES 430F 
CRES 17-7PH 
CRES 4MF wi th  Stellite ball 
CRES 321, 17-7PH wl th  
Teflon FEP seal 
CRES 347 
AWG 20. MIL-W-16878, 
type EE. 19-strand, 
nickel coated 
CRES 321 
No. 
16 
17 
18 
- 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
- 
~ 
Equipment 
Splash plate 
Valve mount ing bracket 
Thrust  chamber sleeve 
Throat inser t  
Nozzle body 
Asbestos wrap 
Glass wrap 
Insulat ion 
Thrust  chamber shel l  
Mount ing flange 
Descriotion 
CRES 321 
6" oriented, high-si l ica. 
fabric-reinforced, 
laminated phenolic 
Refractory graphite. 
z i rconium diboride. 
si l icon composite 
45'oriented, h igh-s i l ica,  
fabric- reinforced, 
laminated phenolic 
Uncured phenolic, res in  
impregnated. 
glass roving 
Alumina si l ica fiber 
CRES 321 
(b) Engine assembly. 
Figure 10. - The CM RCS engine assembly (Block I and Block 11). 
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Poor performance and a changing of the O/F ratio were evident during the pulse 
performance tests. The corrective action that resulted included the design of a 
one-piece orifice cartridge to reduce leak paths, the verification of proper orifice in- 
stallation to prevent bypass flow, and the tightening of controls on the valve seat manu- 
facturing operation. Another problem was that the nozzle extension seal leaked during 
the hot fire tests; secondary O-ring seals were added. 
Supplemental qualification tests were conducted late in the program to certify a 
6" oriented uncharred combustion chamber liner as a replacement for the original 
6" oriented precharred liner. The change was required because of delamination, blis- 
tering, and tackiness problems with the old billets. The apparent cause for this prob- 
lem was a breakdown of the fabrication control. 
Additional supplemental qualification tests were conducted to certify the engine 
for 200-second deorbit burns that would be required for a hybrid deorbit. Performance 
degradation was allowed, but engine structural integrity had to be maintained for this 
type of burn. 
Although the problems that developed during the qualification tests were resolved, 
the rejection rate was  very high after the engines were being produced and checked out 
on the vehicles. The primary problems were internal valve leakage and slow valve re- 
sponse. After the qualification tests, failure analyses showed that the problems were 
caused by various forms of internal engine contamination: miscellaneous particulate 
contamination, corrosion products, and residual propellant contamination from the hot 
fire calibration tests. In all cases, it was determined that the engine valves were not 
designed for  effective cleaning. Although numerous changes were made in the manu- 
facturing and assembly, decontamination, and quality control procedures, the basic 
problems were never resolved completely. Engine rejection rates  caused by this prob- 
lem remained relatively high. In some cases, discrepant engines were not found until 
the first checkout after installation on the spacecraft. 
Helium solenoid valve. - A basic design deficiency was noted during certification 
testing of the original 1/4-inch helium solenoid valve. An incompatibility between ni- 
trogen tetroxide and the nickel plating in the plunger bore caused binding of the plunger 
in the bore and rendered the valve inoperative. A second, equally severe problem was 
the lack of effective production of the metal-to-ceramic seals that were used to seal  the 
wiring. The severity of these problems resulted in  replacement of the valve in space- 
craft 017 and subsequent vehicles with one of a newer design. 
One of two failures during certification of the new design unit was valve leakage 
that was caused by particulate contamination, which subsequently required the use of 
special cleaning procedures before final valve assembly. The other failure was an 
uninitiated closure of the valve during supplemental qualification vibration tests (random 
vibration) that necessitated the installation of a new bellows and flow deflector assembly 
that had a lower mass than did the old unit. 
Propellant solenoid-type latching valves. - The original propellant solenoid-type 
latching valve was used on spacecraft 009 only. Tests revealed that severe propellant 
incompatibility existed, which caused the valve to fail. Furthermore, the position indi- 
cator switch was not linked mechanically to the poppet, but w a s  driven by a separate 
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armature.  Thus, a stuck poppet could not be detected by the indicator. The design 
deficiencies resulted in the replacement of the valve. No significant problems were 
encountered during the subsequent certification tes ts  of the new valve. 
A shortcoming of the qualification tes ts  was observed during the Apollo 9 mission. 
Some of the valves closed inadvertently at CSM/Saturn IVB (S-IVB) separation. Inves- 
tigation proved that the shock from separation pyrotechnics, estimated to be up to 260g 
for  1 to 3 milliseconds, was sufficient to cause the valves to close. The problem oc- 
curred on subsequent missions and also involved the helium isolation valve. No design 
changes were made in either unit because the problem could be handled operationally 
by cycling the valves, which had inadvertently closed, to the '(open" position. 
Propellant quantity gaging system.- Design deficiencies were evidenced by numer- 
ous failures during the tes ts  of virtually all assemblies within the radioisotope propel- 
lant quantity gaging system. Functional failures and out-of-specification problems were 
a source of constant trouble during the qualification period. Although the equipment 
was on spacecraft 009, it was not qualified and was not operational. The system was 
removed from spacecraft 011 and from subsequent vehicles and was replaced with the 
PVT ground computer program by the use of existing instrumentation. Later ,  the on- 
board P/T sensor technique was added to provide gaging information (independent of the 
PVT ground computer program) in  the spacecraft. 
The SM RCS engine. - Certification of the SM RCS engine was  initiated on a 
95-pound thrust configuration unit for  spacecraft 009. This unit did not have the ther- 
mal insulator on the fuel valve. Basic certification was continued on the spacecraft 011 
configuration that had the thrust increased to 100 pounds and incorporated the fuel valve 
thermal insulator. 
During the certification program, two basic problems developed. Injector mani- 
fold explosions caused several  engine failures that were attributed to  a facility problem 
which was  solved by the use of tes ts  conducted at a higher vacuum level. No hardware 
changes were made on the engine. 
Engine explosions that occurred during pulse-firing duty cycles were a severe 
problem. Three corrective actions were taken to resolve the problem. A preignitor 
was incorporated in the injector to provide more uniform ignition. Furthermore, the 
engine bell nut temperature was limited to a minimum of 30" F, and the fuel was  
changed from A- 50 to MMH. The last change, was the most significant; it reduced the 
unstable residues that were formed during pulse-firing modes and that were the basic 
cause of the explosions. 
Supplemental qualification programs were conducted to certify the engine f o r  use 
with helium saturated MMH fuel, with 0.4 to  0.8 percent nitrous oxide in the nitrogen 
tetroxide, and with a r c  suppression in the valve electrical  circuitry. 
The SM RCS heaters. - Two heater configurations were used on the SM RCS. Early 
units had an integrally mounted thermostat. On spacecraft 103 and subsequent vehicles, 
all units had remotely placed thermostats. During the life cycle tes ts  on a unit that had 
an integrally mounted thermostat, a bonding material  failure occurred. The failure was 
attributed to test  equipment; no corrective action was taken. Later,  in spacecraft 008 
testing a t  MSC, the design inadequacy in the heater bonding technique was noted again. 
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As a result of the problem, a mechanical clamp w a s  used to hold the heaters in 
place until a new bonding technique could be developed and verified. 
Additional certification. - A 90-day propellant compatibility program and a com- 
ponent quality verification program were conducted. The primary objective of the 
90-day propellant compatibility test was to demonstrate the capability of the Apollo 
Block 11 SM RCS to sustain propellant exposure for 90 days. A secondary objective was 
to determine and demonstrate the minimum launch pad support that would be required 
during the standby portion of a 90-day period. Another secondary objective was  to dem- 
onstrate propellant compatibility for extended mission durations. 
Three tes ts  were used to support the 90-day test objectives. The first test  was to 
demonstrate 90-day propellant compatibility without requirements for special continuous 
purges, bleeds, and system exercising, and to establish the simplest method of launch 
pad operations and support. The second test  w a s  to demonstrate SM RCS operation for 
a 103-day period that included 13 days of prelaunch plus 90 days of postlaunch test  ac- 
tivity with the system in operation. The third test  was to demonstrate 90-day propellant 
compatibility by the use of special protective procedures and operations to provide max- 
imum assurance of achieving 90-day propellant compatibility with the existing systems 
and components. At the conclusion of the exposure tests,  all three quads were test  
fired successfully and were run through a post-.test functional check. After the system- 
level tests,  the quads were disassembled and the components were sent to the various 
contractors for inspection and testing. From the results of these tests,  i t  was estab- 
lished that the system and components had at least a 103-day propellant exposure capa- 
bility. No component modifications were made as a result of the tests; no failures that 
required corrective action occurred. 
The component quality verification tests were conducted on selected components 
to verify that the units that were produced were of the same quality as the units that 
were used to qualify the component. Explosive and solenoid-operated isolation valves, 
check valves, propellant tanks, relief valves, regulators, and engines were subjected 
to selected qualification-type tes ts  (including environmental tests). All units passed 
these tes ts  satisfactorily; no corrective action was necessary. 
FLIGHT MISSIONS 
Active reaction control systems were not needed or used on the early boilerplate 
(BP) Apollo flights (BP-15, BP-26, BP-9, and spacecraft 002). However, thermal and 
vibration data obtained f rom inactive o r  simulated hardware on these flights were useful 
in the design and testing of the f i rs t  RCS hardware. Data obtained on later flights (be- 
ginning with spacecraft 009) included performance evaluation and anomalies within or 
affecting the CSM RCS. Changes in hardware or  procedures (or both) were instituted as 
a result  of the flight experience. 
Mi ssion A -102 
Boilerplate 15 (BP-15) was launched down the Eastern Test Range from KSC on 
September 18, 1964. The launch vehicle (SA-7) was an S-I Block I1 vehicle. The purpose 
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of mission A-102 was to demonstrate the compatibility of the spacecraft with the launch 
environment. The CM and SM were boilerplates that were used to simulate the actual 
vehicles in dimensions and mass characteristics. 
The SM RCS was simulated by the use of four boilerplate external engine packages, 
and each boilerplate consisted of the engine package and four simulated engines. Only 
quad A w a s  instrumented. Sixteen thermocouples were mounted on the positive-pitch, 
negative-pitch, and counterclockwise-roll engines of quad A. Two accelerometers w e r e  
mounted in the nozzle of the clockwise-roll engine. 
By means of prelaunch thermal analysis, it was predicted that SM RCS engine 
nozzle temperatures would be in the 1800" to 2200" F range as a result of launch aero- 
dynamic heating. Flight data indicated maximum temperatures of 700" to 800" F, but 
were invalid f o r  two reasons. First, major differences in geometry, material, and 
thermal "capacitance" existed between the boilerplate engines that were used and the 
actual engine hardware. Second, the relatively massive, sheathed thermocouples that 
were used on the flight were unsatisfactory for the measurement of large temperature 
transients. The reasons were verified in postflight tes ts  and indicated that further tes ts  
should be performed. 
The vibration data indicated that the energy was concentrated primarily a t  a f re-  
quency of 190 hertz, at which frequency the power spectral  density analyses indicated 
values from lOOg /Hz to 115g /Hz. These levels, although greater than the design 
levels, were questionable because of dissimilarities between the boilerplate hardware 
and the actual hardware. 
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Missions SA-8 and SA-10 
Because of the uncertainties in the SM RCS temperature data from BP-15, two 
additional tests were planned. These tes ts  were to be added to the existing SA-8 and 
SA-10 missions, which were launched on May 25 and July 30, 1965, respectively. The 
purpose of the tests was to obtain sufficient launch heating data for the SM RCS engines 
to facilitate verification of the capability of the engines to withstand the launch environ- 
ment. These tests were conducted during the SA-8 mission (BP-26) and the SA-10 mis- 
sion (BP-9); both test vehicles were launched by the S-IB from KSC. 
Each boilerplate SM was fitted with a single RCS quad A engine package that con- 
sisted of the engine housing and four engines. The internal components of the quad, 
which included the propellant storage and helium pressurization systems, were not in- 
stalled. Twelve fast-response thermocouples were installed on the upward-firing 
(positive-pitch) engine and on the side-firing (negative-roll) engine. 
The BP-26 and BP-9 followed almost identical launch trajectories,  and the 
temperature-time data from the engines were s imilar .  The maximum temperatures 
measured were 1320" F on the lip of the upward-firing engine nozzle and 1390" F on the 
upper (windward) surface of the side-firing nozzle. The temperatures peaked a t  approx- 
imately T + 132 seconds. Based on these temperature-time data, heating ra tes  were 
determined and were correlated with the aerodynamic flow field model. As a result ,  
the worst-case launch heating predictions were revised; the capability of the hardware 
to withstand the launch environment was verified. 
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Mission A-004 
Mission A-004 (spacecraft 002) was launched with a Little Joe I1 vehicle on Janu- 
a ry  20, 1966, at the White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. The primary objective 
of the mission was to subject the CM to a power-on tumbling abort. The secondary 
objective was to determine vibration levels on the SM structure and on the SM RCS. 
The results of previous acoustic and vibration tes ts  on the SM structure and the 
results of the RCS flight data for BP-15 caused concern. Consequently, one quad on 
spacecraft 002 was instrumented with six vibration sensors  (two on the forward engine, 
two on the counterclockwise engine, one on the panel, and one on the oxidizer tank sup- 
port). Masses were used instead of tanks and propellants. The results of the flight 
indicated that the vibration levels were nominal. The concern that was based on the 
previous acoustic and vibration tes ts  was dispelled. 
Mission AS -201 
Mission AS-201 (spacecraft 009) was the first flight test  of a production Apollo 
Block I type spacecraft in conjunction with the S-IB launch vehicle. The unmanned sub- 
orbital flight was launched from Complex 34 at  KSC on February 26, 1966. The CM 
landed safely in the primary landing area near Ascension Island in the Eastern Test 
Range approximately 37 minutes later and was recovered as planned. The major mis- 
sion objectives were the demonstration of the compatibility and structural  integrity of 
the spacecraft and the S-IB configuration, and the evaluation of the spacecraft heat 
shield performance during a high heating rate entry. 
Configuration of the CSM RCS. - The SM RCS was the basic Block I system located 
on the SM (fig. 11); a system schematic is shown in figure 12. The propellants that 
were used for  mission AS-201 were nitrogen tetroxide (oxidizer) and a blend of 50 per- 
cent by weight hydrazine (N H ) and 50 percent by weight unsymmetrical dimethylhydra- 
zine (UDMH) fuel. The CM RCS was the basic Block I configuration that is shown in 
figures 13 and 14; a schematic of the propellant feed systems is shown in figure 15. 
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The only SM RCS components that were known to be malfunctioning before lift-off 
were the propellant quantity gaging system, inoperative because of problems encoun- 
tered during checkout, and a number of primary-stage helium check valves that were 
leaking. All secondary-stage check valves were functioning normally. 
The only CM RCS components that were known to have failed before lift-off were 
a system B relief valve burst  diaphragm and, as was the case with the SM, some of the 
primary-stage helium check valves. None of the malfunctioned components caused 
degradation of the mission. 
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of quads. 
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Figure 11. - The SM RCS (Block I). 
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Figure 12. - Schematic of the SM RCS quad (Block I). 
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roll engine 
Figure 13. - Component locations on the 
CM RCS (Block I, +Y axis). 
Counterclockwise- 
Clockwise-roll engine 
system B 
Figure 14. - Component locations on the 
CM RCS (Block I, -Y axis). 
Figure 15. - Schematic of the CM RCS propellant feed systems A and B (Block I). 
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Performance summary. - The SM RCS successfully performed the pitch maneuver 
that was required before CM/SM separation. The proper attitude control was main- 
tained, even though quad A was inoperative and one of the negative-yaw (-Y) engines 
(probably on quad D, although this was never positively established) either was inopera- 
tive or produced only partial thrust. However, as a result of the quad A and -Y-engine 
problems, the positive translation (+X) maneuvers produced less than a nominal velocity 
change when the spacecraft attitudes and ra tes  were maintained. The performance com- 
pared favorably with that which was predicted, considering the effects of the disabled 
engines, and nominal engine thrusts were produced by the operating engines. 
The CM RCS successfully performed all the required maneuvers and maintained 
proper spacecraft control until electrical problems caused the system B engines to be 
disabled at T + 1641 seconds and caused the system A engines to be disabled a t  
T + 1649 seconds. Command module control was  maintained through the maximum 
dynamic pressure (max ) region. 
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Anomalies. - Several failures were incurred during mission AS-201. The SM 
quad A became inoperative because of the v'closedf' position failure of the oxidizer 
isolation valve. The failure was not detected during system activation because the in- 
dicator switch was not linked mechanically to the pQppet. A partial, o r  possibly com- 
plete, loss of thrust from one of the -Y engines occurred when the automatic coils were 
used. The engine that was involved and the cause of the failure could not be determined 
definitely from the available data. After blackout, both systems A and B of the CM RCS 
were lost because the RCS control motor switches were transferred from the "CM" to 
the "SM" position. The system B logic power failure resulted in the loss of system B 
of the CM RCS for  use in the propellant depletion burn. The system B logic power fail- 
u re  caused the loss in the CM RCS of the use  of the systems A and B helium intercon- 
nect valves, the system A fuel tank helium bypass pyrotechnic valve, and the system B 
oxidizer tank helium bypass pyrotechnic valve. The failure of the CM RCS oxidizer 
isolation valves to close during the postflight deactivation occurred because of the in- 
compatibility between the valves and the oxidizer. 
Corrective action. - As a result of the failures just described, the following cor- 
rective actions were implemented. The incompatible propellant isolation valve was re-  
placed with one of a new design that was compatible with the propellant. Additionally, 
the position indicator switch within the valve was  linked mechanically to the poppet and 
thereby registered the correct poppet position. The remaining electrical problems 
were caused by CM/SM umbilical wires that were still energized electrically when sev- 
ered by the guillotine. When high heating ra tes  were. encountered during entry, the 
insulation burned off and many of the w i r e s  were shorted. The shorts resulted in the 
electrical problems that have been described. To preclude recurrence of this type Of 
problem, all electrical circuits that were to  be severed by the guillotine were isolated 
upstream f rom the guillotine before CM/SM separation. Furthermore,  a redundant 
t ransfer  switch was added to the control circuitry to ensure that RCS engine control 
would be transferred from the SM to the CM. 
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Mission AS-202 
Mission AS-202 (spacecraft 011) was the second flight test of a production Apollo 
Block I spacecraft that used the uprated S-I launch vehicle. This unmanned suborbital 
flight was launched from Complex 34 at  KSC on August 25, 1966. The CM landed as 
scheduled in the primary landing area in the southwest Pacific Ocean (near Wake Island) 
approximately 1 hour 33 minutes later and was recovered as planned. The major mis- 
sion objectives were to prove the structural integrity and compatibility of the combined 
spacecraft to the uprated S-I configuration, to verify the operational capability, and to 
evaluate the CM heat shield performance during a high heat load entry. 
Configuration of the CSM RCS. - The SM RCS configuration on spacecraft 011 was 
identical to that on spacecraft 009 with the following exceptions. The SM RCS engine 
for spacecraft 011 was  of the spacecraft 012 configuration; that is, the SM RCS engine 
produced 100 pounds rather than 95 pounds of thrust and had a fuel valve thermal 
standoff to increase thermal resistance between the valve and the i:,ijector. The pro- 
pellant isolation valves had been redesigned and had improved performance and propel- 
lant compatibility characteristics. The helium isolation valve was of the spacecraft 012 
configuration; that is, the helium isolation valve had a n  improved poppet design. The 
fuel used for this mission was MMH rather than A-50. 
With the following exceptions, the CM RCS configuration on spacecraft 011 was 
identical to that on spacecraft 009. The propellant isolation valves were of a new design 
and had improved performance and propellant compatibility. The CM RCS engine for 
spacecraft 011 was of the new configuration that included an epoxy-coated throat and 
liner and an improved valve design, The propellant tanks were of the new configuration 
that had tank bladders which were the same size as the tank shell rather than longer 
than the shell. Additionally, the ends of the oxidizer tank bladders were 9 mils rather 
than 6 mils thick. 
Performance summary. - The CM RCS and SM RCS inflight performances were. 
nominal throughout the mission. All maneuvers that involved RCS thrusters were com- 
pleted as planned, and the attitude rates that were attained were as predicted. 
Anomalies. - Only one SM RCS component malfunctioned during the mission. 
Shortly before lift-off, a quad C relief valve burst disk (fig. 7) was ruptured. The 
burst disk rupture occurred during activation of quad C on the pad approximately 
4.5 hours before launch. When the helium isolation valve on quad C was opened to pres- 
surize the propellant tanks, the pressure downstream f rom the regulators surged to 
320 psia during the activation transient and ruptured the relief valve burst disk. Sub- 
sequently, the pressure stabilized at  220 psia after activation, which indicated that the 
overpressure ruptured the burst diaphragm and vented overboard through the relief 
valve. On the first SM RCS burn, the pressure downstream from the regulator dropped 
to the nominal regulated pressure, which indicated that the regulator was functioning 
properly . 
Also, one CM RCS anomaly was identified. During postflight inspection, the CM 
system A oxidizer and the system B fuel relief valve burst diaphragms were noted to 
have been ruptured. An examination of the data taken at the time of CM RCS activation 
indicated that a pressure surge occurred which was  similar to the pressure surge 
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described for the SM RCS quad C. In the case of the CM, the ullage volumes were 
smaller than the ullage volumes of the SM, providing less  flcapacitancelt to absorb 
the regulator activation surge. 
Corrective actions. - Although the failures in the SM and CM were similar,  the 
corrective actions were different. The SM problem was resolved by means of prepres- 
surization of the volume downstream from the regulator to control the lockup pressure.  
Therefore, when the helium isolation valves were opened to activate the system, the 
regulators were already in the ttclosedtt position. The CM problem could not be re- 
solved by means of a simple procedural change because it was not possible to fly the 
entire mission with a prepressurized CM RCS. Already, restrictive orifices had been 
placed in the helium supply lines to limit the maximum helium flow rate. It was de- 
cided to reduce the orifice s ize  further to eliminate the activation pressure surge. Be- 
cause the burst disk rupture on the CM did little to compromise system reliability, it 
was decided to make the change effective on Block I1 vehicles. 
Apollo 4 Mission 
The Apollo 4 spacecraft (spacecraft 017) was launched from KSC on November 9, 
1967. Mission objectives included demonstration of (1) the compatibility of the S-V 
launch vehicle and the spacecraft and (2) the adequacy of the Block I1 entry systems un- 
der simulated high heat ra te  lunar return conditions. The spacecraft 017/S-NB com- 
bination was placed in an earth parking orbit for two revolutions. Then, the S-IVB 
stage was reignited to place the spacecraft in a simulated translunar trajectory. The 
spacecraft was cold soaked for 4.5 hours, and the thickest side of the CM heat shield 
was positioned away from the solar vector. At the conclusion of the 4.5-hour cold soak, 
the SPS engine was fired to increase the spacecraft inertial velocity. After the SPS 
burn, the CM w a s  separated from the SM, and the CM was oriented to the entry attitude. 
The SM RCS thermal control system was used for the f i r s t  time on this mission, and it 
performed satisfactorily throughout the flight. 
The heaters on all four quads actuated satisfactorily in a repeatable manner. The 
quad package temperatures and the temperatures of the engine injector heads that were 
instrumented were maintained within acceptable temperature limits during CM/SM 
separation. 
The CM RCS engines were maintained passively at acceptable temperatures from 
launch to system activation. The maximum engine temperatures that were encountered 
f rom system activation to landing were within design limits. 
Configuration of the CSM RCS. - The SM RCS configuration, except fo r  the addition 
of a modified heavy engine mount structure and an  engine heater system, was s imilar  
to that of spacecraft 011. The CM RCS configuration of spacecraft 017 was identical to 
that of spacecraft 011. 
Performance summary. - The SM RCS and CM RCS inflight performance was with- 
in the nominal range throughout the mission. All maneuvers were completed as planned 
during the time the RCS engines were used. Satisfactory maneuver rates, accelerations, 
and translational velocity changes were attained. Propellant usage w a s  normal for both 
the CM RCS and the SM RCS. Approximately 16 000 SM engine firings were performed 
during the course of the mission. 
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Anomalies. - The only anomaly that w a s  associated with the SM RCS was a pre- 
launch pressure decay in the quad A helium source pressure.  The pressure data in- 
dicated a fairly uniform decrease from 4150 psia at servicing to  3910 psia at launch. 
The leak rate was approximately 5 psi/hr (26 sccm). A decay rate as much as 17 psi/hr 
and a minimum pressure as low as 3440 psia were acceptable for  this unmanned space- 
craft launch; hence, the leakage caused no problems relative to the mission. 
Two anomalies were noted on the CM during postflight examination. After land- 
ing, there was a residual pressure of several  hundred psia in the CM RCS after the 
purge operation. The residual pressure w a s  attributed to the configuration of the pro- 
pellant tanks and the helium purge systems. 
By examination of the CM RCS, it was noted that there were ruptured burst disks 
in the system A oxidizer relief valve and in the system B fuel relief valve. The anomaly 
was expected because it had been characteristic .of all previous missions and the 
ground-based test  programs. 
Corrective action. - The leakage problem on systems of this nature had been a 
continuous problem. Leak checks before servicing were intended to preclude problems 
of this type. Because the source of the SM RCS leakage was never identified specifi- 
cally, no definite corrective action could be taken against any one suspected component. 
The general action that was taken included added emphasis on leak checks, particularly 
where mechanical joints (screw fittings) were used. 
The residual pressure that was noted in the CM RCS after landing resulted in two 
corrective actions. First, the Teflon disks that covered the helium vents were per- 
forated to  facilitate easier helium outflow from the tanks. Second, the purge bypass 
line discharge w a s  moved f rom the liquid side vent line to the tank discharge line. This 
change made it possible fo r  gas outside the bladder to vent directly into the discharge 
line without passing through the inside of the bladder. The change negated the capabil- 
ity for  purging any residual propellant from inside the tank. Retaining the capability 
for  the purge was not a necessity. The corrective action for  the ruptured relief valve 
burst  disk involved the relocation of the two relief valves to  provide more volume be- 
tween the regulators and the relief valves. 
Apollo 6 Mission 
The Apollo 6 spacecraft (spacecraft 020) was  launched on April 4, 1968, f rom 
Complex 39A at KSC. The mission objectives were essentially the same as those for  
the Apollo 4 mission. The launch-phase profile was nominal until two engines in the 
S-I1 stage shut down prematurely. The shutdown caused the remaining three S-I1 en- 
gines and the S-IVB engine to f i r e  longer than w a s  planned to obtain the desired veloc- 
ity. During the S-IVB engine firing, a substantial amount of steering was  needed in an 
attempt to  correct  the e r r o r  that the S-I1 stage had generated in the trajectory plane. 
At the time of thrust termination, the orbit was 198 by 96 nautical miles instead of the 
100-nautical-mile circular orbit that had been planned. The vehicle remained in earth 
orbit for the next 3 hours. During this period, systems were checked, operational tests 
(such as S-band evaluation) were conducted, and several  attitude maneuvers were 
performed. 
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The second S-TVB firing was scheduled to  occur during the time of the pass over 
KSC at the end of the second orbit, but the firing could not be accomplished. Therefore, 
the CSM was separated from the S-IVB, and an SPS engine firing sequence was initiated. 
The firing was of a long duration of 442 seconds that resulted in a 12 019. 5- by 
18-nautical-mile free-return orbit. After SPS engine cut-off, the CSM was maneuvered 
to  a cold-soak attitude, in which the aft end of the spacecraft was oriented sunward. 
This attitude facilitated the attainment of the desired shading on the CM. The cold- 
soak attitude was maintained for  approximately 6 hours. 
Because the SPS was used to insert  the spacecraft into the desired high apogee 
orbit, insufficient propellant remained to gain the high velocity that was desired from 
the second SPS engine firing. Specifically, the total propellant that remained would 
have resulted in only 22 percent of the desired velocity increase. The decision was to 
inhibit the second firing. A complete firing sequence was performed, including all nom- 
inal events, except that thrust was inhibited. 
After the SPS cut-off signal, the CSM was maneuvered to  a separation attitude and 
the SM was separated. Then, CM entry attitude orientation and coast to an altitude of 
400 000 feet occurred. The entry interface was reached at a velocity of 32 830 ft/sec 
and a flight path angle of -5.85' . The interface conditions were less than planned; as 
a result, the heating ra tes  and loads during entry were lower than were desired. 
Configuration of the CSM RCS. - With two exceptions, the Apollo 6 SM RCS con- 
figuration was similar to that used on the Apollo 4 mission. Firs t ,  some of the engines 
had integral propellant inlet filters that were mandatory for Block 11. Second, heater 
brackets were used on the Apollo 6 spacecraft to supplement the adhesive bonding be- 
cause of a failure of the adhesive on the thermal vacuum test  vehicle. The Apollo 6 CM 
configuration was identical to that of the Apollo 4 CM except that the amount of oxidizer 
which was  loaded was reduced by approximately 5 pounds in each system. These quan- 
tities were reduced to ensure that the oxidizer would be depleted before the fuel during 
the depletion burn. The expulsion of raw oxidizer on the parachutes could cause deteri- 
oration of the parachute nylon. 
Performance summary. - Both the CM RCS and the SM RCS performed nominally 
throughout the flight except for the thermal control on one quad. All maneuvers during 
which the RCS was used were completed satisfactorily. Normal maneuver ra tes ,  accel- 
erations, and translational velocity changes were attained. Propellant usage by both 
systems was normal. The thermal control system for  the SM RCS maintained the engine 
mount structure and injector head temperatures at satisfactory levels for quads A, B, 
and D. Anomalous temperatures were noted for  quad C during the early portion of the 
cold-soak phase of the mission. 
Anomalies. - The only nonnominal performance during the flight involved the ab- 
normal thermal performance of quad C. During the early portion of the cold-soak phase 
of the mission, the quad C engine mount structure cool.ed excessively, and the quad C 
clockwise-roll engine injector underwent unexplained temperature excursions. 
During postflight examination, two additional RCS anomalies were found. The 
burst disks in two of the relief valves were ruptured, an anomaly that was anticipated. 
Corrective action was identified but was  not implemented on this vehicle. A second 
CM RCS anomaly involved the crosswiring of the oxidizer and fuel valves on the four 
yaw engines. Crosswiring had no effect on flight performance because the valves were 
wired in parallel and received a common firing signal. However, a postflight decon- 
tamination problem was encountered because the valves were energized one at  a time 
so that the fuel and oxidizer systems could be cleaned independently. 
Corrective action. - The corrective actions that were taken after the Apollo 6 mis- 
sion were limited. The cause of the quad C temperature excursion was never identified 
positively; therefore, no corrective action was taken. The CM relief valve problem 
was not a new problem on the Apollo 6 flight; corrective action was planned for  subse- 
quent vehicles. The CM engine crosswiring problem was not a hardware deficiency, 
but was rather a manufacturing e r ro r  that was  not detected by existing quality control 
procedures; therefore, a new test was added to ensure proper wiring. Many times, 
this type of corrective action is not practical. Most frequently, ensuring adequate or  
effective quality control is a more reasonable solution. 
Apollo 7 Mission 
The Apollo 7 mission (spacecraft 101) was the first manned Apollo mission and 
was launched from KSC with the S-I launch vehicle on October 11, 1968; the mission 
duration was approximately 260 hours. The spacecraft landed in the Atlantic Ocean on 
October 22, 1968. The crewmen were Walter Schirra, Walter Cunningham, and Donn 
Eisele. The purpose of the mission was to determine the capability of the spacecraft, 
the crewmen, and the Manned Space Flight Network (MSFN) support facilities to conduct 
an earth orbital mission. 
Several detailed test objectives (DTO'S) were defined for the CSM RCS. The SM 
DTO's were to determine the adequacy of the SM RCS during all primary guidance, 
navigation, and control subsystem (PGNCS) modes, SCS modes, and manual control 
modes; to operate in both pulsing and steady-state modes; and to operate by the use of 
both automatic and manual valve coils. Other DTO's were to obtain data on SM RCS 
propellant consumption during a variety of maneuvers and control modes and to obtain 
data on CM RCS usage during entry. Additional objectives were (1) to evaluate the ac- 
curacy of SM RCS AV maneuvers of the PGNCS, (2) to determine the amount of SM 
RCS propellant that was needed to maintain spacecraft stability during long-term main 
propellant slosh after SPS or  RCS burns, and (3) to develop an optimum procedure for 
initiating spacecraft attitude control after the SPS and RCS burns. 
The determination of the amount of SM RCS or CM RCS propellant consumption 
was also included in the following DTO's. 
1. Attitude control, using PGNCS 
2. Entry, using PGNCS 
3. Attitude control, using SCS 
4. Backup alinement procedure, using SCS 
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5. Separation, transposition, and simulated docking 
6. Active rendezvous of the CSM with another vehicle 
Configuration of the CSM RCS. - The Apollo 7 SM RCS had the f i r s t  Block I1 con- 
figuration. The major change involved the addition of two propellant tanks, which were 
the s ize  of the CM propellant tanks, on a significantly lengthened SM RCS panel. In 
addition, several minor changes were incorporated into the Block I1 configuration. For 
example, check valves that had integral f i l ters were used a t  all check locations, and 
engines that had integral inlet f i l ters  were also used. To reduce f i re  hazards, the SM 
RCS panel insulation was encapsulated with H-film (polyamide). Propellant isolation 
valves were added to provide the capability for isolating the new tanks from the engines 
independently of the old tanks. A larger helium tank was installed to accommodate the 
increased propellant expulsion requirement. Finally, the onboard P /T and real-time 
ground-computed %aging systems were used to determine propellant quantity. 
A schematic of the Block I1 SM RCS quad is shown in figure 2, and the quad is 
shown pictorially in figure 1. The relative locations of the SM RCS and SPS components 
within the SM a r e  shown in figure 16, the SM RCS quad engine package is shown in fig- 
u re  17, and an individual SM RCS engine is shown in figure 3. 
The spacecraft 101 CM RCS was changed slightly from the Block I configuration. 
The components were rearranged somewhat on the component panels, and the forward- 
pitch engines were repositioned from a one-over-the-other to a side-by-side configura- 
tion. A schematic of the spacecraft 101 CM RCS is shown in figure 18; a CM RCS 
engine is shown in figure 10. 
-Helium pressurization tank 
pressurization tank 
-Secondary fuel tank 
sys 7 
Beams 2 and 5 
xs 355 
Secondary fuel lank 
Pr imaty fuel tank 
Primary oxidizer tank 
Secondary oxidizer tank 
xs 280 
(a) Top view. (b) View looking inboard, bays 3 and 6 
(bays 2 and 5 mir ror  image). 
Figure 16. - Location of the RCS and SPS components within the SM (Block 11). 
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Package temperature 
Figure 17. - The SM RCS quad engine package (Block 11). (a) Quad; (b) Engine package 
propellant manifold; (c) Complete engine package assembly; (d) Engine mounting 
structure, inboard view; (e) Engine mounting structure, outboard view. 
a System A engines Relief valve pressure KEY 
Squib valve 
Check valve 
- Oxldlzer 
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Figure 18. - Schematic of the CM RCS (Block 11). 
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Performance summary. - All system operations were normal, except for the SM 
RCS quad B onboard P/T sensor, which failed before launch. All test  objectives were 
met. Static firings of the four aft-firing SM RCS engines fo r  1 second were accom- 
plished satisfactorily approximately 25 minutes before launch. The firings were audible 
to the crewmen. Evaluation of spacecraft body rates indicated normal performance of 
the SM RCS throughout the flight. 
A total of 875 pounds of SM RCS propellant, of the 1342 pounds that were loaded, 
was used during the flight. Except for the S -NB rendezvous, the propellant consump- 
tion approximated the predicted usage as adjusted by flight plan changes. The S - N B  
rendezvous required approximately 11 percent (37 pounds) more propellant than was 
predicted. 
Thermal control of the SM RCS was satisfactory throughout the flight. The pri- 
mary heaters on al l  four quads were activated a t  earth orbit insertion, and the heaters 
remained active for the remainder of the mission. 
No helium or propellant leakage from the CM RCS was noted before activation for  
the deorbit maneuver. The system was activated and the propellant isolation valves 
were opened soon after the deorbit maneuver. Both the manual and the automatic con- 
t rols  were used during entry in combinations of dual- and single-system firings. The 
systems functioned normally during entry. 
A total of 50 pounds of CM RCS propellant was used, 29 pounds f rom system A 
and 21 pounds from system B. No propellant depletion burn was performed during the 
Apollo 7 mission. The CM landed with RCS propellants on board. 
Anomalies. - Two anomalies were noted during and after the flight. F i r s t ,  the 
onboard P/T sensor for the SM RCS quad B failed before launch. The cause of this fail- 
u re  was unknown. Second, during postflight testing of the CM RCS relief valve, an ex- 
cessive amount of leakage through the closed oxidizer isolation valves was  observed. 
The oxidizer isolation valves opened when voltage was removed, and the position indi- 
cator switch s o  indicated. The valves were spring-loaded closed by means of a bellows 
preload and should have remained closed when voltage was removed. 
Corrective action. - Because the SM was not recovered, the failed SM RCS quad B 
onboard P/T sensor was not available for investigation, and the cause of the failure 
remains unknown. Postflight data analysis did not aid in isolating the cause, and no 
corrective action could be taken. The failed CM RCS oxidizer valves were removed and 
sent to the contractor for postflight tes ts  and analyses. A 0.05- to 0.06-inch compres- 
sion of the bellows was noted. Evidently, the permanent compression of the two bellows 
and the resultant reduction in seat load and opening voltage were caused by a pressure 
surge when the CM helium system was activated a t  the time the isolation valves were in 
the "closed" position. An identical fa i lure  mode was noted in the early developmental 
phase of the valve; the intended procedure was to activate the system with the valves 
in the "open" position. The fact that the fuel  valves did not fail can possibly be ex- 
plained by the existence of a shorter  and less dense fluid column between the isolation 
valve and the propellant tank. The fuel valves were not tested to determine whether 
degradation had occurred. The corrective action was to open the isolation valves before 
the system was activated on subsequent Apollo flights. 
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Apollo 8 Mission 
The Apollo 8 (spacecraft 103) mission was the second manned Apollo mission, the 
f i rs t  manned S-V mission, and the first manned lunar orbit mission. Launch w a s  on 
December 21, 1968, from KSC, and the mission duration was  approximately 147 hours. 
The spacecraft landed in the mid-Pacific recovery a rea  on December 27, 1968. The 
crewmen were Frank Borman, James  Lovell, and William Anders. 
The purpose of the mission was to demonstrate the capability of the spacecraft, 
the crewmen, and the MSFN support facilities to  conduct a deep space and lunar orbit 
mission. Also, the mission was designed to meet development and verification test  
objectives that were not met on previous missions. 
The DTO's that were defined f o r  the CSM RCS are as follows. In the space envi- 
ronment thermal control DTO, an attempt was made to demonstrate that the passive 
thermal control mode of operation was adequate to maintain spacecraft systems and 
components (including the CSM RCS) within acceptable thermal limits. In the midcourse 
correction capability DTO, an attempt was made to evaluate the PGNCS SPS/RCS guid- 
ance and control capability to make the required translunar and transearth midcourse 
corrections. Another DTO was to determine the effect, if any, of SM RCS engine firings 
on contamination of the CM windows. Also, the determination of SM RCS and CM RCS 
propellant use was included as a portion of several  other test  objectives. 
Configuration of the CSM RCS. - The Apollo 8 SM RCS configuration was similar 
to the Apollo 7 configuration except for the following improvements. On the Apollo 8 
SM RCS, a capability for electrically isolating individual engines was incorporated. 
The aluminized Mylar insulation on the SM RCS panels was replaced by multilayer blan- 
kets of aluminized H-film; on the Apollo 7 SM RCS, only the outer layer was H-film. 
The all H-film insulation further improved fire protection. Additional radiation shields 
were added to the Apollo 8 SM insulation system to prevent the SM RCS tanks from ra- 
diating heat to the cold areas that were internal to the SM. 
The Apollo 8 CM RCS was similar to the Apollo 7 CM RCS, except that the abra- 
sion pads in the propellant tanks were perforated to  facilitate more rapid and complete 
venting of helium during the purge operation. Also, the amount of oxidizer that was 
offloaded was increased by 4 pounds per tank to  reduce further the possibility of para- 
chute damage during the propellant depletion burn after entry. 
Performance summary. - The SM RCS and the CM RCS performed satisfactorily 
throughout the Apollo 8 mission. All system parameters were within the normal range, 
and no flight anomalies occurred. All test  objectives were met. Static firing of the 
SM RCS engines on the pad was not performed a s  it was on the Apollo 7 mission. Evalu- 
ation of spacecraft body rates indicated normal performance of the SM RCS throughout 
the flight. 
A total of 634 pounds, of the 1343 pounds of SM RCS propellant that were loaded, 
was used during the flight. The predicted propellant usage, adjusted for the flight plan 
changes, was 668 pounds. An estimated 46 000 firings of the SM RCS engines were 
made. 
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Thermal control of the SM RCS was satisfactory throughout the flight. The pri-  
mary heaters on all four quads were activated soon after earth orbit insertion; the 
heaters remained active for the remainder of the mission. 
No CM RCS helium or propellant leakage was noted before activation. The CM 
RCS systems were activated approximately 1 hour before CM/SM separation, and the 
systems were checked briefly by the crewmen. 
Both manual and automatic controls were used during entry. Approximately 
20 seconds after the CM/SM separation, the CM RCS system B was deactivated; the 
remainder of entry was performed by the use of system A only. An evaluation of the 
spacecraft body rate data indicated that system A functioned normally. After deploy- 
ment of the main parachutes, the remaining CM RCS propellant was dumped, and the 
helium system blowdown and the propellant line purge were initiated. The propellant 
isolation valves were closed approximately 20 seconds before landing. 
A total of 34.7 pounds of CM RCS propellant was used (34.1 pounds from sys-  
tem A and 0.6 pound f rom system B) before the propellant dump; 825 CM RCS engine 
firings were made. 
Anomalies. - Several anomalies occurred during the Apollo 8 mission. All  the 
anomalies were noted after the flight; these anomalies in no way compromised the mis- 
sion. During postflight examination of the vehicle ra te  data, the rates  that developed 
during SM RCS negative-pitch maneuvers were found to be approximately 20 percent 
less than they should have been. Further investigation indicated that the problem was 
caused by gas impingement on, and deflection by, the CSM umbilical which was located 
just forward of the engine. 
During CM RCS posff light decontamination and testing, two other problems were 
noted. At the time of the CM flushing operation, large quantities of fluids leaked past 
the throat plugs in the engines. Also, the CM RCS system A helium check valve on the 
oxidizer side was leaking considerably more than was allowed by specifications. 
Corrective action. - The quad C negative-pitch rate anomaly did not necessitate 
corrective action, other than to account for the reduced rate during preflight planning 
and posff light evaluation. Reexamination of the Apollo 7 data indicated that the reduced 
rate  was present in quad C also but had not been detected. 
NO single cause was identified for  flush fluid leakage around the CM engine throat 
plug. Conditions that contributed to the leakage included some throat erosion and im- 
properly refurbished throat plugs. Material that dropped into the throat f rom drilling 
on the vehicle during postflight recovery activity compounded the problem. Further- 
more, possible damage may have resulted f r o m  the improper removal of safety plugs 
that had been installed while the CM was on the recovery ship. The landing safing team 
director agreed to make notations in the recovery manual to prevent this type of leakage 
on future missions. 
Check valve leakage was caused by deterioration of the nitroso rubber seat mate- 
rial. The nitroso rubber was chosen because of its compatibility with the oxidizer 
(N204). The check valves were subjected to an  IPA flushing test as a par t  of the 
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cleanliness verification program for the 'component. It was noted that an incompatibility 
existed between nitroso rubber being used and IPA, which resulted in valve seat stick- 
iness, degradation, and leakage. The out-of-tolerance leakage that occurred during 
postflight testing was located in the spacecraft 103 CM RCS system A oxidizer check 
valve. The leakage was attributed to the cause just discussed. On subsequent vehicles, 
only check valves that had not been exposed to  IPA were used. 
Apol lo 9 Mission 
The Apollo 9 (spacecraft 104) mission was the third manned Apollo mission, the 
second manned S-V mission, and the f i rs t  manned LM mission. Launch was on 
March 3, 1969, f rom KSC, and the mission duration was approximately 241 hours. The 
spacecraft landed in the Atlantic Ocean on March 13, 1969. James McDivitt, David 
Scott, and Russell Schweickart were the crewmen. 
The primary purpose of the mission w a s  to evaluate the LM systems performance 
and to perform selected CSM and LM operations in  earth orbit. Various DTO's were 
defined for  the CSM RCS. For example, the SM RCS propellant consumption was de- 
termined during the orbital navigation and landmark tracking. Data were obtained on 
the effects of the tower jettison motor, the S-I1 retrofire, and the SM RCS exhaust on 
the CSM. Performance of the LM passive thermal design that was exposed to natural 
and propulsion-induced environments was verified. Active docking of the CSM with the 
LM was conducted, and the SM RCS propellant consumption was determined for this 
maneuver. The LM/CSM undocking was accomplished by use  of the SM RCS, the CSM 
accelerations were computed, and the SM RCS propellant consumption was determined. 
A pyrotechnic LM/CSM separation w a s  performed, the CSM acceleration was computed, 
and the SM RCS propellant consumption was determined. 
Configuration of the CSM RCS. - The only difference in the RCS of the Apollo 8 
and Apollo 9 CSM was the addition of an isolation valve in the Apollo 9 helium line to 
the secondary fuel tanks on the SM quads. The purpose of this valve (normally closed) 
was to provide a means by which depletion of the primary fuel tank could be determined. 
Depletion would be evidenced by a decay in the fuel manifold pressure.  When the fuel 
manifold pressure  decayed, the new isolation valve would be opened, allowing the pro- 
pellant pressure  to return to normal. 
Performance summary. - The SM RCS and the CM RCS performed satisfactorily 
throughout the mission. The only anomaly was the inadvertent closure of some SM RCS 
isolation valves during CSM/LM/S-IVB separation. The valves were opened later by 
the crewmen and remained open for  the rest of the mission. All system parameters 
were normal during the mission, and all test  objectives were met. The SM RCS engines 
were not static fired on the pad. An evaluation of spacecraft body ra tes  indicated that 
RCS performance was normal throughout the flight. 
A total of 790 pounds of SM RCS propellant was used during the mission. The 
predicted usage, corrected f o r  flight plan changes, was 598 pounds. Most of the dis- 
crepancy between the actual and the predicted propellant consumption occurred while 
the quad C propellant isolation valves were closed and during the undocked LM-active 
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period. The secondary fuel tank helium isolation valves on all quads were opened be- 
fore CM/SM separation, although no primary tank fuel depletion had been indicated. A 
total of 57 000 firings was estimated for the 16 SM RCS engines. Thermal control of 
the SM RCS was satisfactory throughout the flight. 
Both manual control and automatic control of the CM RCS were used during entry. 
Approximately 12 seconds after CM/SM separation, system B was deactivated; the re- 
mainder of entry was performed by the use of system A only. An evaluation of the 
spacecraft body rates  indicated normal CM RCS performance. 
A total of 27.5 pounds of CM RCS propellant was used for  entry. The remaining 
217.5 pounds were burned during the depletion burn after main parachute deployment. 
Anomalies. - Two minor instrumentation anomalies occurred during the Apollo 9 
mission. The first anomaly occurred during the preflight phase shortly after servicing, 
and w a s  determined to be leakage around the sea l  of the quad C high-pressure helium 
manifold pressure transducer. The second anomaly was evidenced by the periodic 
250-psi increases in the reading of the quad B helium tank pressure transducer. The 
reading returned to normal after the increase. 
Another, more disturbing anomaly was the inadvertent closure of some of the pro- 
pellant isolation valves. After CSM/S-IVB separation, the crewmen reported a control 
problem that had lasted for approximately 12 minutes during the transposition period. 
The crewmen f i r s t  noticed a lack of capability for translation to the left. The position 
indicator flags for the quad C primary and secondary propellant isolation valves and the 
quad D secondary valves were in the ttclosed" position. The valves were reopened; 
thereafter, the system performed normally. The valves that had been opened during 
final checks before launch were verified ttopen'' during orbit insertion checks by the 
crewmen, and also were verified "open" during a cursory examination of the panel 
after the commander and the command module pilot exchanged seats before SLA 
separation. 
The propellant isolation valve closure caused triggering of the caution and warning 
switch for the quad A engine package temperature. The high temperature on quad A OC- 
curred because the left translation was being requested, and quad C, with i ts  closed 
isolation valves, was unable to provide impulse. A counterclockwise roll  resulted and 
caused the PGNCS to correct by firing the clockwise-roll engine. 
e r s  on quad A fired, which caused the temperature to increase. Although the caution 
and warning indication was triggered a t  206" F, the 210" F redline was not exceeded. 
Opposing roll  thrust- 
Corrective action. - Of the two minor instrumentation anomalies, the f i rs t ,  which 
involved leakage a t  the transducer, was resolved by replacement of the transducer seal. 
The correction w a s  accomplished during a built-inhold in the countdown and was  done 
without deservicing. The second anomaly, which involved the periodic 250-psi in- 
creases  in quad B helium tank pressure transducer readings, was never explained, and 
no corrective action was taken. 
Extensive investigative effort was expended in an  attempt to explain and correct  
the isolation valve closure problem. The isolation valves were latched open magneti- 
cally and were spring-loaded to the ttClosedtt position. The valves were controlled by 
means of switches on panel 2 that were spring-loaded to the center "Off" Position. 
The four isolation valves in each quad were controlled by one switch. 
, 
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Propellant usage data indicated that all four quad C valves were closed, rendering 
the quad inoperative, and that quad D was performing normally before the crewmen re-  
opened the propellant isolation valves. Propellant could have been supplied from both 
primary tanks and one secondary tank from quad D, because only the valve position 
indicator for the secondary tank w a s  in the "closed" position. The closure of only one 
of the secondary valves was  sufficient to cause the indication. It was suspected that the 
valve closure was caused by mechanical shock at CSM/SLA separation. 
Shock tes ts  were performed later on several isolation valves and on an assembled 
quad. These tes ts  were conducted to determine the shock load that was needed to close 
the valves, and also to determine the effect of the shock loads that were encountered 
during the CSM/SLA separation sequence. The results of the individual valve tes ts  in- 
dicated that 80g (with an onset ra te  of approximately 11 milliseconds) to 140g (with an 
onset ra te  of approximately 1 millisecond) could cause a normal valve to close. The 
shock to the valve that resulted from the pyrotechnic charges which were used to sepa- 
ra te  the CSM from the SLA was estimated to  be between 180g and 260g (with an onset 
ra te  of between 0.2 and 3.0 milliseconds). The Apollo 7 and 8 spacecraft, which had 
the same configuration, did not have the problem. 
The resul ts  of the investigations indicated that the shock a t  CSM/SLA separation 
could have caused the primary and secondary propellant valves to close and that the 
valve closures were not detrimental to the valves. Because the hardware was shown 
not to be affected adversely, flight procedures were modified to verify the isolation 
valve position after exposure to shock environments. No additional corrective action 
was taken. Because the caution and warning anomaly was caused by the isolation valve 
closure, no further action was necessary. 
Apollo 10 Mission 
The Apollo 10 mission (spacecraft 106) was the fourth manned Apollo mission, the 
third manned S-V mission, and the second manned LM mission. Launch was on May 18, 
1969, at KSC, and the mission duration was  approximately 192 hours. The spacecraft 
landed in the Pacific Ocean on May 26, 1969. The crewmen were Thomas Stafford, 
John Young, and Eugene Cernan. 
The primary purpose of the Apollo 10 mission was to evaluate the crewmen, 
spacecraft, and mission support facilities performance during a manned LM lunar mis- 
sion. Also, LM performance was  to be evaluated in the lunar environment. The DTO's 
that were defined for  the CSM RCS were as follows. 
1. During midcourse navigation, to determine SM RCS propellant consumption 
2. During midcourse corrections, to determine the effect of SM RCS performance 
and midcourse corrections 
3. During.lunar landmark tracking, to determine the amount of SM RCS propel- 
lant required during docked operations 
4. During lunar landmark tracking, to determine SM RCS propellant consumption 
f o r  undocked operations 
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Configuration of the CSM RCS. - The only difference between the Apollo 10 and 
Apollo 9 RCS w a s  a change in the Apollo 10 SM RCS secondary-heater thermostat 
switching limits. The switching temperature was changed from a range of 77" to 104" F 
to a range of 120" to 129" F. The Apollo 10 CM RCS was  not changed from the Apollo9 
configuration. 
throughout the Apollo 10 mission. All system parameters were normal during the mis- 
sion and all objectives were met. An evaluation of spacecraft body rates  indicated nor- 
mal SM RCS performance throughout the mission. A total of 580 pounds of SM RCS 
propellant was  used; the predicted consumption was 850 pounds. A total of 43 000 fir- 
ings was estimated for  the 16 SM RCS engines. Thermal control of the SM RCS was 
satisfactory throughout the flight. The primary heaters on all quads were activated 
soon after earth orbit insertion, and the heaters remained active for the rest of the 
mission. 
Performance summary. - The SM RCS and CM RCS performed satisfactorily 
Both the manual and the automatic controls were used during entry. Approxi- 
mately 9 seconds after CM/SM separation, system B w a s  deactivated, and the remainder 
of entry w a s  performed by the use of system A only. An evaluation of the space- 
craft body rates  indicated normal CM RCS performance. 
A total of 32.5 pounds of CM RCS propellant was used for  entry. The remaining 
212.4 pounds were burned during the depletion burn after main parachute deployment. 
Anomalies. - The f i rs t  anomaly, which occurred approximately 3.5 days before 
launch, was a decrease of 0.14 psi/hr in  the CM system A helium manifold pressure.  
The pressure distribution indicated that the leak was downstream from the check valves 
in  the fuel leg. The size of the propellant leak which would be needed to produce the es- 
tablished pressure decay and the absence of propellant vapors in the area were evidence 
that the leak was between the check valves and the fuel manifold of the helium system. 
A mass  spectrometer leak check of the entire system (both preflight and postflight) was 
unproductive. The system was  repressurized to 49 psia approximately 31 hours before 
launch. The leak ra te  appeared to diminish during the mission, and no adverse effect 
on the operation of the system was noted during entry. 
The second anomaly occurred when the CM RCS propellant isolation valves were 
opened approximately 10 hours before launch. The system B helium manifold pressure 
dropped from 44 to 37 psia. Calculations showed that a pressure drop of this magnitude 
would be expected if the oxidizer burst disk were ruptured, allowing oxidizer to flow 
f rom the tank into the oxidizer manifold when the isolation valves were opened. 
Corrective action. - The CM RCS was subjected to extensive preflight and post- 
flight leak checks. Postflight leak checks were conducted a t  50 and 285 psia, but no 
leak could be found. It was recommended that leak tes t s  at  100 psia be conducted ap- 
proximately 30 days before launch on future missions. This procedural change w a s  
designed to ensure that leaks could be found 2nd repaired before the s ta r t  of the 
countdown. 
After calculations had indicated that the system B pressure  drop was Of the mag- 
nitude which would be expected if the oxidizer burst  disk were ruptured, the decision' 
was made to launch without further investigation and to vent the oxidizer f rom the lines 
through the engine after earth orbit insertion. 
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Apollo 11 Mission 
The Apollo 11 mission (spacecraft 107) was the fifth manned Apollo mission, the 
fourth manned S-V mission, the third manned LM mission, and the first manned lunar 
landing mission. Launch was on July 16, 1969, f rom KSC, and the mission duration 
was approximately 195 hours. The spacecraft landed in the Pacific Ocean on July 24, 
1969. The crewmen were Neil Armstrong, Michael Collins, and Edwin Aldrin. 
The primary purpose of this mission was to perform a manned lunar landing and 
return to earth safely. No DTO requirements were involved for the CSM RCS on the 
mission. 
Configuration of the CSM RCS. - No changes were made in either the CM or SM 
RCS configurations for the Apollo 11 mission. The configuration was that which was 
used on the Apollo 10 mission. 
Performance summary. - The SM RCS and CM RCS performed satisfactorily 
throughout the mission. The two anomalies that occurred were an inadvertent isolation 
valve closure during CSM/S-lVB/LM separation and the failure of a CM thruster to  
respond to automatic commands. The isolation valves were reopened later by the crew- 
men (according to established procedures) and remained open for the res t  of the mis- 
sion. The cause of the closure was determined to be s imilar  to that of the closure on 
the Apollo 9 mission. (The shock loads were generated during separation. ) All system 
parameters  were normal during the mission; all mission requirements were met. An 
evaluation of spacecraft body rates indicated normal RCS perf ormance throughout the 
flight. A total of 560 pounds of SM RCS propellant was used during the mission. The 
predicted propellant usage was 590 pounds. 
Thermal control of the SM RCS was nominal throughout the flight. The primary 
heaters on all quads were activated soon after earth orbit insertion, and the heaters 
were active for  the remainder of the mission. 
Both manual and automatic controls of the CM RCS were used during entry. Ap- 
proximately 65 seconds after CM/SM separation, system B was deactivated; the re- 
mainder of entry was performed by the use of system A only. An evaluation of the 
spacecraft body ra tes  indicated normal CM RCS performance with the exception of the 
negative-yaw (-Y) engine. The negative-yaw engine did not respond to automatic com- 
mands, but the engine performed normally with manual o r  direct  coil commands. 
A total of 4 1  pounds of CM RCS propellant w a s  used during entry. The remaining 
205 pounds were burned during the depletion burn after main parachute deployment. 
Anomalies. - A s  was mentioned in the performance summary, the two anomalies 
that occurred during the mission were the inadvertent closure of the propellant isolation 
valve and the failure of one of the CM engines to respond to automatic commands. 
Corrective action. - The corrective action for  the isolation valve problem was 
established after a similar occurrence on the Apollo 9 mission. Because this action 
(which involved cycling the valves to the "open" position) was adequate on both the 
Apollo 9 and Apollo 11 missions, no further hardware o r  procedural changes were 
prescribed. 
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The malfunction of the CM negative-yaw engine in the automatic mode was deter- 
mined during posff light hardware examination and data review. Electrical continuity 
through at least one of the parallel automatic coils in the engine was evidenced by the 
fact that the SCS driver signals were normal. The normal SCS driver signals and the 
existence of a t  least some detectable thrust indicated that one of the two valves was 
working normally. 
During checkout a t  the launch site, another engine failed to respond to commands 
during the valve signature tests.  A faulty terminal board connector was  the cause Of 
the problem. The systems operated nominally after the terminal board was replaced. 
The postflight tests indicated that two pins in the terminal board were loose and 
caused intermittent continuity to the automatic coils of the engine valve. This type of 
failure had been noted on terminal boards that were manufactured before Novem- 
ber  1967. The faulty board was manufactured in 1966. A design change that was made 
to the boards that were manufactured after 1967 precluded failures of this type. Only 
the new boards were to be used on future spacecraft. (The anomalous circuit boards 
were not a part of the CSM RCS; therefore, the boards a r e  not discussed in detail in 
this report. ) 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Development of the command and service module reaction control systems pre- 
sented some unique and challenging engineering problems. The problems were 
adequately treated and good solutions developed, as evidenced by the essentially 
trouble-free operation of the reaction control system during the Apollo missions. How- 
ever, in retrospect, certain problem areas were common to many of the component 
development efforts. The recommendations to minimize the impact of the problems on 
future programs are discussed as follows. 
The initial component function design specifications often were more stringent 
than was necessary because actual requirements were not known. In some cases ,  the 
specification requirements were the projected limits of the s ta te  of the a r t  a t  the an- 
ticipated times of use. As the requirements were defined more fully, there was hesi- 
tancy to relax the specification, which might have resulted in some unnecessary, and 
perhaps unfruitful, efforts. It is recommended that an  intensive effort be expended to 
define requirements accurately as early as possible. Also, as a relaxation in require- 
ments becomes evident, it is recommended that the specification be relaxed if cost o r  
schedule savings can be realized. 
A lack of compatibility of the system and components with the propellants was a 
recognized problem early in the Apollo Program. The major deterrent to efficient 
resolution of the problem was the unavailability of elastomeric materials that were 
compatible with propellants under long-duration exposure. A problem that was not 
recognized until considerably later in the program involved the incompatibility of the 
system and components with the flush fluids (or combinations of flush fluids) and pro- 
pellants. It is recommended that, a t  such t ime as material  compatibility of the system 
and components with fluids is established, all fluids and mixtures of fluids that might 
be introduced into the system be included. Additionally, it is recommended that partic- 
ular  attention be given to the determination of the specific fluids that might be used 
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during manufacturing and checkout of the system and components when the materials 
a r e  selected. Provisions for adequate drying of systems should be made and verified 
if fluid mixing cannot be tolerated. 
Because of the many small  orifices and the close tolerances on moving parts, the 
problem of cleanliness control increased as the Apollo Program progressed. It was 
difficult to assemble a clean system, and the need for component removal and replace- 
ment further increased the problem. To minimize the problem, fi l ters were added to 
the system to protect components that had an unusually high failure rate because of 
contamination. It is recommended that on future programs, all components should be 
designed to be as insensitive to contamination as possible. Additionally, it is recom- 
mended that such components be protected by integral filters. A further recommenda- 
tion is that, if fluids a r e  reverse flowed through any component during a flushing or  
filling operation, both inlet and outlet ports on the component should be protected 
against contamination. If large quantities of contaminants a r e  anticipated, mainstream 
fil ters at the fluid source should be considered for better protection in addition to the 
integral component filters. 
A considerable number of unnecessary and costly situations occurred during the 
development and qualification tests because the production of components was well  un- 
derway before the test programs were completed, particularly during the system-level 
tests. Corrective action for problems that existed during these programs almost al- 
ways involved the retrofit of production units and the modification of completed systems. 
Some problems were tolerated because of the extensive vehicle rework that would be 
required for corrective measures. These shortcomings were compensated for by either 
tolerating higher rejection rates o r  modifying operating procedures. Only limited 
changes were made to the systems as a result  of these late tests. Consequently, the 
test results did little for the development of more reliable systems, but rather were 
useful in instilling confidence in equipment o r  defining operating constraints. A further 
recommendation, therefore, is that extensive efforts be made to integrate the test pro- 
gram schedules with the master production schedules. Specifically, the overall sched- 
ule should be adjusted to provide time to implement the production hardware changes 
dictated by the test program. 
The experience gained during the Apollo Program identified the significant value 
(in t e rms  of total resources and schedules) of separately managed, selective supporting 
development and test evaluation tasks. 
Manned Spacecraft Center 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Houston, Texas, November 9, 1972 
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